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1. S ee O live r  B. P ollak, “Be Just B efore You’re Generous”: Tithing and
Charitable Contributions in Bank ruptcy, 29 CREIGHTON  L. RE V. 527, 534-36 (1996)
( tr ac ing the history and evolution of cases between the tr uste e and r eligiou s
or ga ni za ti on s).  
2. 42 U. S.C . § 20 00b b (19 96).
3. S ee Cit y of Boe rn e v.  Fl or es , 11 7 S . Ct . 21 57 (1 997 ).
4. 82 F.3d 1407 (8th  Cir. 19 96), vacated and reman ded for consideration sub
n om . Ch ri st ia ns  v. C ry st al  Ev an gel ica l F re e Ch ur ch,  117  S. C t.  250 2 (19 97).
5. S ee id . at 1420.
6. S ee C h r is t ian s v.  Cr yst al  Ev an gel ica l F re e Ch ur ch,  117  S. C t.  250 2 (19 97).
Although  the  Suprem e  C ou r t  held that RFRA is unconstitutional as it  relates to state
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In  re Young: A Cor rect  bu t  Unnecessa ry
Con st it u t ion a l Decision
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 In  r e ce n t  ye a r s, t he t en sion  between  ba nkrupt cy t rust e es
and ch ar it able  reli giou s or ga n iza t ion s has  become a  con t inuous
source of lit iga t ion .1 Court s ha ve become ba tt legrounds  wher e
wars ar e waged over money dona ted t o chu rches by debtors who
su bsequ ent ly file for bankrupt cy. These war s have  forced cour t s
to weigh  reli giou s a nd m ora l valu es a gain st  th e economic r ight s
of cred itor s. By en act ing t he  Religiou s F reedom  Rest ora t ion  Act
(RF RA),2 Congress joined th is war  an d at tem pted  to protect  the
conven t ion a l unde rst anding t ha t  la ws  sh ould  give  wa y t o the
freed om of religion in  th e absen ce of a compelling state interest
t h a t  could n ot be addr essed in a  less bur densom e ma nner .
While  th e Su pr eme  Cour t h as  inva lida ted  RFRA in  it s  appl ica -
t ion  to states an d stat e and mu nicipal laws, the question as to
its  residu al validity in federa l sett ings, such a s federal ba nk -
rup tcy  law, remains  open .3
In  re Young4 was  the first case a t t he federa l appellat e level
to conside r  the a pp lica t ion  of RF RA t o a  deb tor ’s p rebankrup tcy
pet ition  (prepetit ion) dona tions t o religious organiza tions. The
Young cou r t  held tha t  RFRA was cons t it u t iona l and  tha t  b a nk-
rup tcy t rus tees  cou ld not  void char ita ble contr ibut ions t o reli-
giou s organizations.5 Recent ly RFRA’s const itu t ion alit y in it s
a ppl ica t ion  to federal laws has been questioned and th e Su-
p reme Cou r t  vaca ted  an d r ema nd ed t he E ight h Cir cuit  Young
de cis ion  to be reviewed in light of the Flores  de cis ion .6 Already
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law, RFRA r ema ins con stit ut iona l as it  app lies t o federa l law. S ee infra  notes 86-117
and accompany ing  t ex t .
7. S ee In re Rivera, 214 B.R. 101, 106 (Bank r. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“However, given
tha t  RFRA was held unconstitu tional by the Su preme C ou r t  i n  Boerne, t he  Ch ur ch
is left  solely with  th e ar gum ent  th at  perm itt ing r ecovery of the cont ribu tions  violat es
the Deb tor s’ Fir st  Ame nd me nt  rig ht s t o fre e ex er cise  of th eir  re ligiou s be liefs .”); In
re Ga tes  Com munit y Ch ape l of R och es ter , I nc., 2 12  B.R . 22 0, 2 26  (Ba nkr . W. D.N. Y.
1997) (ho lding that  the debt or’s RFRA argum ents a re moot because of the Flor es
de cisi on ).
8. S ee infra note 45.
some cour t s , withou t  an alyzing th e scope of th e Flores  de cis ion ,
have reject ed RF RA as comp lete ly un const itu t iona l even  in  it s
ap plicat ion to federal bank ru ptcy law.7 However , t h is  Note
ar gues  tha t  Flores  does  n ot  compel a  differen t ou tcome in  th e
Y ou n g case on rem an d th an  th e decision originally rea ched by
the E ighth  C ircu i t Cour t  of Appea l s.  Add it iona lly , RF RA r e-
mains viable federal law a nd t he Young cour t  cor rect ly ana-
lyzed the issues raised by RFRA and i ts  app lica t ion  to
pr epet ition  charitable donat ions. F ur th erm ore, t he conflict
between  the debtor’s desire to exercise religious beliefs and th e
tr ust ee’s lega l obligations t o protect creditors will not be
re solved until (1) Congress remedies the “constr uctive frau d”
pr ovision of 11 U.S .C . § 548(a )(2) (hereaft er  “§ 548”)8 and (2)
cour t s find a  wa y t o simult aneou sly protect  cred it ors fr om
fraudulen t at tem pt s by som e debt ors t o avoid pa ying t heir
deb t s while r ecognizing an in dividual’s need t o fulfill sincere,
good-fa it h  reli giou s con vict ion s.
This  Note will discuss th e Y oung de cis ion  and R FRA’s
impact  on conflicts bet ween th e sincere religious donor who
becomes  a debt or in ban kr upt cy, an d th e ban kr upt cy trus tee.
Section  II will  discuss t he ba ckground a nd legal event s th at  set
the stage for th e Young’s bankru ptcy. Section III explains the
fact s of Young an d t he r eas oning u sed b y th e Eigh th  Circu it
Cou r t  of App e a ls in  rea chin g it s d ecis ion . Sect ion  IV focu se s on
t he app lica t ion  of RF RA t o § 548  and offe r s a  solu t ion  to the
conflict  be tween  sincer e r eli giou s d onors who become
bankrup tcy debtors  and bankruptcy t rustees . This  Not e
s u gg es t s th at  th e Young cour t  cor rect ly a pp lie d R FRA a nd t he
Fir st  Amendment  to § 548 . However ,  even  i f the  Young cour t
incorr ectly analyzed RFRA, the sam e result  could be achieved
by reading a  good-fa it h  tes t  in to § 548 . F in a lly , t h is  Not e
concludes th at  Congress n eeds to ad dres s th e § 548 problems
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9. U.S. CO N S T . am end . I. 
10. 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (holding that a  state could not deny a p er son
employmen t  in sur an ce based  upon  religious  beliefs th at  preve nt ed he r from  workin g
on  Satur days and caused her to be fired because “[t]he door of the Free Exercise
Clause stan ds tightly closed against an y governm enta l regulation of religious beliefs
as such”) .
11. 406 U.S. 205, 2 15 (1 972 ) (“The essence of all that h as been sa id and writ ten
on  the su bject  i s t h a t  on ly th ose i nt er est s of t he  hig he st  ord er  an d t hos e n ot
otherwise ser ved ca n o ver ba la nce  leg it im at e cla im s t o th e fr ee  exe rci se  of re ligi on .”).
12. S ee Sh erbert , 374  U.S . at  406-0 7; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
13. S ee Em ployme nt  Div., Dep’t of Hum an  Resou rces of Or egon v. Sm it h ,  494
U.S. 872, 883-85 (1990) (holding th at  Sherbert ha s neve r been u sed to invalidate a
law tha t was challenged u nder t he Fr ee Exer cise clause ); see also J ames  R . Mason ,
Comment , Smi th ’s Free-Exercise “Hybrids” Rooted in N on-Free-Exercise Soil,  6 RE G E N T
U. L. RE V. 201, 206-07 (1995) (noting  tha t in th irteen of the seven teen  Fr ee Exe rcise
cases brought before the Su preme Cour t after Sh erbert  t h e religious objector lost
because th e Su pr em e Cou rt  dis tin gu ish ed t hos e ca ses  from  S h e r bert). But see Yoder,
406 U.S. a t 227 (holdin g th at  th e sta te in ter est in  educa tin g its  citi zen s di d n ot
ju st ify violating t he Fr ee Exercise Clause by requirin g Amish children to atten d
sch ool aft er  th e e igh th  gr ad e).
outlined  in  th is  Note , and  amend § 548 t o prot ect cha rit able
contr ibutions absent a ctual frau d.
II. BA CK G R OU N D
 T h e F ir s t  Amendmen t  provides in relevant part  t h a t :
“Congress sha ll  ma ke n o la w r es pe ct in g a n  es tabli sh men t  of
reli gion , or  p roh ibi t ing  the free exer cise t he re of . . .”9 In
in terpre t ing the  Free Exercise clause in t he F irst  Amendm ent ,
the Supr em e Cour t, in  a lin e of cases  inclu din g Sh erbert v.
Verner10 and Wiscons in  v . Yoder,11 crea ted  and a pp lie d t he s t r ict
scru t iny st anda rd t o any gove rnmen t  regu la t ion  tha t  b urden ed
the free  exe rcise of r eli gion . Th e s t r ict  scr u t iny  st anda rd
requ ired  tha t  any governmen t  r egu lat ion  tha t  bu r d en s First
Amendment  religious  freed oms (1) ad van ce a compellin g
govern men t  inter est a nd (2) be the leas t r estr ictive means
possible.12  This strict scrut iny requirement wa s intended to
protect r eligious beliefs from governm ent al infringem ent .
After  S herbert, however , th e Su pr eme  Cour t be gan  car ving
out  exceptions t o the S herbert/ Yoder ru le.  In  some inst an ces
the S herbert / Y oder r u le  wa s  ig nor ed,  over look ed , or
distinguished.13 In cludin g Yoder, ther e were seven t een F ree
Exercise cases decided by the Su prem e Court  after  S herbert
and before Sh erbert was overruled in  E m pl oym ent D iv is ion ,
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14. S ee Mas on, supra not e 13. 
15. S ee id . 
16. 494 U. S. 8 72 (1 990 ).
17. S ee id . at 874.
18. S ee id . a t 882-83. This idea  was fir st de veloped in  Sh erbert v. V ern er, 374
U.S. 398 (1963). S ee dis cus sion  supra  not e 10 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. 
19. S ee i d . at 877-78.
20. Id .
21. Id . at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest In dian Ceme t ery Pr otective Ass’n, 485
U.S. 439 , 45 1 (19 88)).
Department of Hu m an  Resou rces of Oregon, v. S m ith .14 Of those
seven teen , the  Supreme Cour t  found  tha t t he Free Exercise
Clause  did n ot  app ly in  th ir t een  of th e ca se s; t h ree  of th e
remain ing four were unem ployment cases.15 Ess e nt ially, t he
Supreme Cour t  crea ted  a  ru le  gran t ing enor m ous  s tr ength  to
reli giou s freed oms, bu t s tr ictly na rr owed it s a pplica t ion  to
employment cases.
Even tu ally,  th e S herbert / Y oder line of cases was  limited
s t r ict ly to their facts by the  Supreme Cour t  in  S m ith .16 In
S m ith , the Suprem e Court  addressed whet her  Ore gon could
deny unem ploym en t  benefit s t o Na t ive  Amer ica ns w ho had
been dischar ged for work-rela ted  miscondu ct  st em min g fr om
th eir  use of peyote in religious ceremonies.17 The  Na tive
Amer icans ar gued  th at  den ying them  un emp loymen t be nefit s
for  using peyote was a substan tial bu rden on the free exercise
of their  reli gion  and th erefore the government  had to sa t is fy  the
s t r ict  scrutiny stan dard. 18 The  Su pr eme  Cour t r efuse d t o app ly
the st rict  scru tin y st an da rd  an d in st ead  held  th at  gener ally
applicable and neutr al laws override religious liberty claims.19
S m ith ’s “genera lly applicable an d neu tr al law” test  provides
th a t  if the governm ent ’s action wa s gener ally applicable,
neu tr ally a pplied, and only incidentally burdened the exercise
of r eligious belief, then  “th e Firs t Amen dmen t h as n ot been
offen ded .”20 Sp ecifi ca lly , t he Cour t  he ld  tha t  “[t ]he  government ’s
a bility to en force ge ner a lly  app lica ble  pr ohibi t ion s of s ocia l ly
harmfu l conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of
pu blic pol icy, ‘can not  de pe nd on  mea suring the effects of a
governmenta l act ion  on  a  re ligious  ob jector ’s  spi r itua l
developm en t.’”21 Ra ther  than  holding tha t  the  pr even t ion  of
drug ab u se was a compelling state interest t hat  satisfied the
least r e st r ict ive  means,  the  Supreme Cour t  r educed the
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22. The re du ction  in t he  st an da rd  an d pr ote ction  of  Firs t  Ame nd me nt  Fr eed om
of Religion r ight s wa s un neces sar y, because even t he comp elling in ter est t est w ould
ha ve prot ected a gain st a na rchy. Th ere is  a compellin g sta te in ter est in  avoiding
an ar chy. For a  more  in-dept h discu ssion of the ha rm s of r edu cing  th e pr ote ction s of
the compelling interest test, see J ames D. Gordon III, T he N ew F ree E xerci se Cl au se,
26 CAP . U. L. RE V. 65 (1997). 
23. S ee Mich ae l M. D uclos ,  A Debtor’s Right to T i t h e in  Bankrup tcy Under  the
R eligi ous  Freedom  Rest oration  Act, 11 BANKR. DE V. J . 665,  670 (1 995); see, e.g., In re
Young, 82 F .3d  140 7, 1 418 -19 (8 th  Cir . 19 96).
24. S ee 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1996); see also 139 CO N G. RE C . H2363 (daily ed.
May 11, 1993); 139 CO N G. RE C . S1 447 1 (daily ed . Oct. 27, 1993); 139 CO N G. RE C .
H8713-15 (da ily ed . Nov . 3, 19 93); see also Michael W. McConn ell, Ins ti t u tions  and
In terpre ta t ion : A Critique of City of Boer ne v. Flores , 111 HARV. L. RE V. 153, 161
(199 7).
25. S ee 42 U .S. C. § 2 000 bb(a )(4) (19 96).
26. 42 U. S.C . § 20 00b b(b) (1 996 ).
27. S ee Du clos , supra n ote  23 a t 6 65-66 ; see, e.g., Young, 82 F.3d at 1407, 1418-
19 (1996), vaca ted  an d r em an ded  for con sid erat ion  su b n om . Chr is t ians v.  Cryst a l
Evange l ica l Fr ee  Ch ur ch,  117  S. C t.  250 2 (19 97).
pr otection  for  funda men ta l r eli giou s beliefs.22 S m ith ’s  holding
severely limited t he S herbert / Y oder line of cases an d ended  the
ap plicat ion  of th e str ict scrut iny test  to cases in wh ich the free
exercise of religion was burdened. 23
Cons equ en tly,  an d in dir ect respons e to th e S m ith  decis ion ,
Congress, by an overwh elming m ajority in both h ouses,  passed
RFRA in 1993.24 In RF RA, Congress rejected th e S m ith  holding
and made specific findings t h a t even  gener ally a pplica ble
neu t ra l laws can subst an t i a lly burde n  the fr ee  exe rcise of
reli gion .25 Congress’ an i mosity towar d th e S m ith  decision was
explicit, a nd  RFRA open ly declar es t ha t it s pu rp ose is:
( 1 ) to r es tor e t h e com pe llin g in te re st  te st  as  set  fort h  in
S h e r be r t  v. Ver n er , 374  U .S. 3 98 (1 963 ) an d W iscon s in  v .
Yoder ,  406  U .S. 2 05 (1 972 ) an d t o gu a r a n tee it s a pp licat ion in
a l l ca ses  where  f r ee  exe rc i se  of  r e l ig ion  i s  subs t a n t ially
b u r de n ed ; a n d
(2) to p rov ide  a cla im  or d efen se  to p er son s w h ose  re ligiou s
exe rc i se  i s  subs t an t i a l ly  bu rdened  by  gove rnm en t . 26
RFRA rein st at es th e str ict scrutiny t est for any law t ha t
su b st a n t ially bu rde ns t he fr ee  exe rcise of r eli gion .27 I f a  pa r ty
proves th at  th e st at ut e bein g enfor ced su bst an tia lly b u r dens
the exercise of his or her r eligion, then th at st atu te must  pass a
st rict  scru tin y st an da rd  or be de eme d u ncons tit ut iona l.
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28. 117 S. Ct. 2 157 (1997). 
29. S ee i d . at  2160. 
30. S ee i d .
31. S ee i d .
32. S ee i d . at  2162. 
33. S ee i d . at  2163 (“Legislation w hich de ter s or r emed ies const itu t ion a l
viola tion s can fall wit hin  th e sweep  of Congress’ enforcemen t power  even if in t he
process it  pr oh ibi ts  con du ct w hi ch i s n ot i ts elf u nco n st it u t iona l  and in t rudes  in to
‘legislat ive spheres of aut onomy previously reserved to th e St at es.’ ” (quotin g
Fit zpat rick  v. Bitzer , 427 U.S . 445, 455 (1976 ))). 
34. S ee i d . at 2171.
35. S ee i d . at  2170. 
36. Bu t see id. at 2172 (Steve n s, J ., con cur ri ng ) (“In m y opin ion,  th e Re ligiou s
Freed om Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a ‘law respecting an  establishm ent of
r e ligion ’ th at  viol at es  th e F ir st  Ame nd me nt  to t he  Con st it ut ion .”).
Im med iat ely after  Congr es s p ass ed  RF RA, ques t ion s a bou t
its  cons t itu t iona l ity  were ra i sed.  In  City  of B oern e v.  Flores ,28
Boerne den ied  the Ca tholic Church  a  permi t t o en la rge  a
church  inside city limits.29 The  Archb ish op su ed, cla imin g th at
the zoning rest rictions were a  subst an tial bu rden  on th e free
exercise of reli gion  and t her e fore viola ted  RF RA. 30 The  city of
Boerne a rgued  tha t  RFRA was uncons t itu t iona l ,31 cl a iming tha t
Congress abu sed its p ower un der  section  5  of t he  Four t een th
Amendment  to im pos e RFRA r equir em en ts on  t he states.32
Not ing tha t  sect ion  5 of t he  Four t een th  Amendmen t  power  i s
limited  to r em edial measures,33 t he  Supreme Cour t  he ld  tha t
RFRA was an improper use of Congress’ en forcemen t power
un der  sect ion  5  of the  Four teen th  Amendment .34 Sp ecifi ca lly,
the Supreme Cour t  he ld  that  R F RA att empt s to creat e a
su bst an tive  change in  cons t itu t iona l  law a nd  is  not  r emedia l
l eg i s la t i on . 3 5  Alt h ou gh  RF RA h a s  b ee n  de cl a re d
u n con s t it u t i on a l in its application to state s,  RF RA’s
cons t it u t iona li t y in it s a pplica tion  to t he  feder al gover n m ent
and fe de ra l la ws  has n ot  been  de cided  by t he S upr em e Cour t .36
Pending fin a l r es olu t ion  of the is su es  by t he Supr em e Cour t ,
the judiciary will continu e to be forced to assess  the
cons t it u t iona li t y of RFRA in t he  ban kr up tcy cont ext . Thu s, t he
key issu es ba nk ru pt cy judges will cont inu e to wr est le wit h  a re
(1) whether RFRA is const it u t ion a l, (2 ) wh et her  the s t r ict
scru t iny test  applies, and  (3) wheth er  a  cr edi tor ’s  cl a ims  a re
su fficient ly compe lling t o just ify burde nin g r eli giou s fr eedom s.
Bankrup tcy cour t s a r e  sp li t  on  whe th er R FRA is const itu tion al,
and those that h ave found it  const i t ut iona l have  st rugg led to
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37. S ee Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer , Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the
R eligi ous  Freed om  R est orat ion  Act , 69 S. CAL . L. RE V. 589, 591-96 (1996) (discussin g
the Cou rt ’s pr oble m o f ha vin g t o de cide  wh et he r R FR A is s us ta in ab le or  no t).  
38. S ee In  re Newm an , 183 B.R. 239 , 252 (Ban kr . D. Kan . 1995) (holding th at
voiding conveyances to religious organizations is not a su bstan tial burden  on the free
exercise of religion and that  even if it  is a substan tia l burden th e bankru ptcy code
is a comp elling gover nm ent  int ere st), judgm ent affirm ed ,  203  B.R. 239 (Bank .  D.  Kan .
199 6).  Bu t s ee In  re Tessier , 190 B.R.  396,  405 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995) (holding th at
p reven t ing a debt or from p ayin g tith ing is a  subs ta nt ia l  bu r d e n  on th e debtor’s free
exercise of religion and t h a t th e bankr uptcy code was not a compelling government
in t ere s t ), ap pea l d ism iss ed , 12 7 F .3d  110 6 (9t h C ir . 19 97).
39. S ee In  re Young, 82 F .3d 1407, 1410 (8t h Cir . 1996) (noting t ha t Levi t icus
27:30, 32 (New In ter na tion a l Version of th e Bible), sta tes t ha t “[a] tith e of everyth ing
from  th e lan d, whet her  gra in from  th e soil or  fr uit  from  th e t re es,  belon gs t o th e
Lord; it is h oly to th e Lord ”), vacated an d  rem an ded  for con sid erat ion  su b n om .
Chr is t ians v. C ry st al  Ev an gel ica l F re e Ch ur ch,  117  S.C t.  250 2 (19 97).
40. S ee id .
41. S ee id .
42. S ee id . 
43. S ee 11 U.S. C. § 1 01(3 2)(A) (19 96) (“ ‘[I]ns olven t’ mea ns , wit h r efer en ce t o an
en t ity oth er  th an  a p ar tn er sh ip a nd  a m un icipa lit y, fin an cial  condit ion  such  tha t  t he
sum of such en tit y’s debt s is gre at er t ha n a ll of such en tit y’s proper ty, at  a fair
ap ply the str ict scrutiny standa r d.37 Ban kr up tcy cour ts  ha ve
a l so rea ched differen t conclusions on wh eth er § 548
su bst an tia lly bu rde ns t he fr ee  exe rcise of r eli giou s beliefs, a nd
whet her  a com pellin g st a te in ter es t  just i fi es  the burden .38 In
the wak e of t h e tu rmoil cr ea ted  by t he d ivision  in  the cou r t s
over t he se is su es, Young was decided.
III. IN  R E  Y O UN G
A. Facts
 B r u ce Youn g a nd h is  family  were a ct ive m em ber s of t he
Crystal Eva nge lical F re e Ch ur ch a nd  ha d, for several years,
diligently paid a ppr oxima tely one-tent h  of their  income t o th eir
church  as  t ith ing.39  Th e m oney w as u se d t o su pp or t  the ch urch
and its  work.40 Alth ough  the church encoura ged its members t o
pay t i th ing , payment  was  not  compulsory  and th e Youngs
would  not  have b een  de n ied  acces s t o any ch urch  funct ion s or
benefit s ha d t he y refu sed  to pa y tit hin g.41 However ,  it  was
un disput ed tha t  the Youn gs  were s in cer e in  their  reli giou s
belief an d felt  obligat ed t o pay t it h i n g a s  a  commandmen t  of
God.42 In  February 19 92, t he You ngs filed for Ch apt er 7
ba nk ru pt cy. It  wa s d et er min ed  tha t  du r in g t he ye ar  pr ior  to
th eir  filing, at a  time wh en t he Youn gs were  in solven t ,43 th ey
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val ua tion  . . . . ”).
44. S ee Young, 82 F.3d at 1410.
45. 11 U.S .C. §  548  provides  in  per t inen t  par t :
(a)  The t ru stee  ma y av oi d a n y tr an sfer of an  int eres t of the  debt or in
proper ty,  or a ny  obliga tion  incu rr ed b y th e de bt or, t ha t w as  ma de or
incurred  on or within one year before t h e  d a t e of th e filin g of th e pe tit ion,
if th e debt or volun ta rily or in volunt ar ily—
 (1)  made  such  tr ans fe r  or  i n curr ed such obligation with actual int ent
t o h i n der, delay, or defrau d any en tity to which t he debt or was or be c am e,
on  or  aft er  th e d at e t ha t s uch  tr an sfe r was m ade or  such  obl iga t ion  was
incurred, or in deb te d; or
(2)(A) re ceive d le ss  th an  a r ea son ab ly eq ui va len t v al ue  in  exch ang e for
such  t r ans fe r  or  obl iga t ion ; and
(B)(I) was in solve n t  on  t he da te  th at  su ch t ra ns fer  wa s m ad e or  su ch
obliga tion  was  incur red ,  or  became  in solven t a s a  re su lt of s uch  tr an sfer  or
obliga tion  . . . .
46. S ee Young, 82 F.3d at 1410.
47. S ee id. 
48. S ee id . 
49. Id . at 1411.
50. S ee id .  The court did n ot  find any actua l fraud, but impu ted fraud u nder
the provis ions of § 548(a)(2). See id.  at 1411-13.
51. Id .
had contr ibut ed $13,4 50.00 t o th eir  church .44 The t ru stee filed
an  adver sar y proceeding under  § 54845 to recover t he m oney
from  th e church  a s  a  fr audu len t  t r ans fe r .46 Under  § 548  and
absen t actua l i nt en t  to de fraud t he cr ed it ors,  the bankrupt cy
t rus tee mus t  p rove tha t  “(1 ) the re was  a  t r ans fe r  of the deb tor ’s
in terest  in pr opert y (2) mad e on or wit hin  one yea r p reced ing
th e filing of th e petit ion (3) while th e debtors wer e insolvent (4)
in  exch ange for  wh ich  the debt ors r eceived less  th an  rea sona bly
equ iva len t  valu e.”47 The  pa rt ies st ipu la t ed to th e first t hr ee
factors and  the bankruptcy  cour t  was left to decide whet her  th e
deb tor s ha d received rea sona bly equ ivalen t va lue for t heir
tra nsfers.48 The ban kru ptcy court h eld tha t “any benefit was
st r ictly re ligious a nd  th us  me re ly incide nt al.”49 The cour t
concluded  th at  religious  ben efits a re ju dicially u nr ecognizable
and the refore  the debt ors d id not r eceive rea sonably equivalen t
valu e and each tithing donation ther efore constitut ed a
fraudulen t t r ans fe r .50 Moreover, the bankru ptcy court  held that
even if a ben efit wa s confer re d on t he  Youngs  by t h e  ch urch , it
was not cont ingent u pon their  paymen t of tithing an d was
th er efore n ot r eceived “in exch an ge for” the  tit hin g.51
The Youngs appea led  to a  federa l district  court  wh er e, for
the firs t  t ime,  the deb tors  a rgued tha t  § 548  was  an
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52. S ee In  re Young, 152  B.R. 939, 950 -51 (Ban k. D. Min n. 199 3). 
53. S ee id .  at 948 -49.  Th e d ist ri ct cou rt  al so h eld  th at  eve n i f th e s er vice s of t he
church  were  of reason ably e qua l va lu e t hey  we re n ot  r ec ei ve d “i n  ex ch ange  for ” the
t i t h ing an d th ere fore voida ble. S ee i d .
54. S ee id . 
55. S ee Young, 82 F.3 d at  1412. 
56. 42 U. S.C . § 20 00b b-3(a ) (199 6) (“This chapte r  [RFRA]  appl ies  to a l l Federa l
and St at e La w, a nd  th e im ple me nt at ion of  t h a t  l a w, whether  stat utory or other wise,
and wh et he r a dop te d b efor e or  aft er  Nov em ber  16,  199 3.”).
57. S ee id .  The  Jus t ice Depa r tmen t  in ter vened , filing a br ief suppor tin g th e
tru stee,  but imm ediately before oral ar gumen ts, the J ustice Depart ment  withdrew
from  th e case. Th e tr ust ee was  subs tit ut ed for th e J ust ice  D ep a rtmen t  and,  accord ing
to th e cour t, a bly pr esen ted  ora l ar gum ent s. See id.  at  1413. 
58. S ee id . at 1416.
59. S ee id . at 1417.
60. S ee supra  not es 24-27 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. 
61. S ee 42 U .S.C . § 200 0bb (1 996); Young, 82 F.3 d at  1416. 
uncons t itu t iona l burden  on  their  free  exe rcise of r eli gion .52 The
dist rict  cour t , h owever , a gr eed w it h  the bankrupt cy cou r t ’s
det erm ina tion  th at  th e Youngs d id n ot r eceive rea sona bly
equ iva len t  va lue  for  the ir  money,  and tha t  the  di spu ted  t ith ing
const itut ed a  voidab le  fr audu len t  t r ans fe r .53 The court t hen
tu rn ed to the  is sue of cons t itu t iona lity  and he ld  tha t  the
bankrup tcy code was n eut ra l in a pplica tion, its effect upon
reli gion  was in cidenta l, and t ha t § 548 met  th e S m ith
r equ i remen t s an d wa s, t her efore, const itu tion al. 54 The  Youngs
app ealed  the d is t r ict  cour t  hold in g t o the E igh th  Cir cu it  Cou r t
of Appeals.
B. Reason ing
  While th e Young’s a ppea l to t he  Eigh th  Ci rcu i t Cour t  of
Appea l s wa s p en ding, Congr es s p ass ed  RF RA. 55 Because RFRA
has r e t roact ive  effect ,56 t he  cour t  a l lowed  both  pa rt ies t o file
supplementa l briefs evalua ting h ow RFRA affected th e lower
cour t ’s de cis ion .57 Afte r  hear ing ora l  a rg um ent s, t he cir cuit
cour t  agr eed with  th e dist rict court  an d held t ha t a bsent  RFRA
the t r ansfe r s w er e voida ble  unde r  § 548.5 8  The ci r cu i t cou r t
th en t ur ned t o the issu e of how RFRA effected § 548.59
As previously explained,60 RF RA r equir es  cour t s t o em ploy
the Sherbert/ Yoder s t r ict  scru t iny s tandard to dete rmine
whet her  or  not  a  res t r ict ion  on reli gion  is  cons t itu t iona l .61
Using th i s ana lysis, th e first  que st ion is wh eth er t he s ta tu te in
ques t ion , in this case § 548, substan tially burdens a person ’s
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62. S ee Young,  82 F .3d a t  1418; Sherber t  v .  Verner ,  374 U.S. 398 , 40 3-04  (196 3).
63. S ee 42 U .S.C . § 200 0bb (1 996); Young, 82 F.3d at 1416, 1419.
64. Young, 82 F.3d at  1418 (alter at ions in or iginal) (quot ing Werne r  v.  McCot t er ,
49 F.3d  1476, 148 0 (10th  Cir. 19 95), cert . d eni ed , 11 7 S .Ct . 18 52 (1 997 )).
65. Id .
66. S ee id .
67. S ee id .
68. S ee id . a t 1 421 -22 (B ogu e, J ., d iss en ti ng ).
abil it y t o exe rcise h is  reli gion .62 I f the  cour t  i s sa t is fi ed  tha t  the
par ty seekin g to invoke the  pr otection  of RFRA has  p roven  tha t
the st at ut e in  question substa ntially burdens t he exercise of his
reli gion , th e govern men t is t hen  requ ired t o prove that  th e
s ta tu te sa t is fi es  a  s t r ict  scru t iny s tandard—tha t  th e sta tu te (1)
adva nces a  comp ell in g gove rnmen t  in ter es t , a nd (2 ) it  i s t he
least res t r ict ive  mea ns b y wh ich  to fulfill tha t  compell ing
government inter est.63
On th e issue of wheth er § 548 subs tan t i a lly burdened  the
Youn g’s a bility t o exercise t heir  religion, t he cour t h eld t ha t
[i]n  o r d e r  t o b e  co n s id e r e d  a  ‘s u b s t a n t ia l ’ b u r d e n , t h e
g ov e r n m e n t a l a ction m us t “sign ifican tly in hib it or  const ra in
cond u ct  o r  expres s ion  tha t  ma n i fe s t s  some  cen t r a l  t ene t  of a
[p e rs on ’s ] ind iv idua l  [ re l ig ious]  beliefs; m us t m ea nin gfully
cu r t a il a [p er son ’s] a bilit y t o exp re ss  ad h er en ce t o h is or  h e r
fa it h ; o r  mu s t  deny  a  [pe rs on]  r easonab le  oppor tun i t i e s  t o
enga ge  in  t hose  ac t iv it i e s  t ha t  a r e  fun dam en ta l  t o  a  [pe r son’s ]
re ligion .”64
The court believed th at  RFRA requir ed th at  th is ru le be viewed
broa dly and  tha t  i t should include “religiously motivated as well
a s re ligiously comp elled cond uct .”65 Us ing  th is  ru le , the cour t
held  th at  § 548 substa nt ially burd ened religiously motivated
conduct  by voiding tr an sfers t o chu rches. 66 Voidin g ti th ing
cont r ibu t ion s p reven t s chur ch m em ber s from  followin g th e
dictat es of their  sin cere r eligious convictions  an d pa ying t ith ing
for  at  leas t  a  yea r b efore t he y pet ition  for ba nk ru pt cy.67 The
t r u s t ee asser ted, a nd t he dissen t a greed, th at  th e only burden
from the a pp lica t ion  of § 548  wa s void in g con t r ibu t ion s t o
churches for one year  immed iately pr ecedin g the  pe t it ion  for
ba nk ru pt cy. The Youn gs were a ble to tith e before a nd a fter
bankrup tcy an d could fin d oth er  wa ys to exer cise their  reli giou s
beliefs.68 The majority rejected this argument  and instead
decided tha t  § 548  is  a  subs t an t i a l burden  and found  tha t
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69. S ee id . at 1418-19.
70. S ee id . at 1419.
71. S ee id .
72. S ee id . The cour t looked a t t he conflicting opin ions  on  whe the r  t he
ba nk ru pt cy code adva nced a  compelling gover nm ent al int eres t in  In re Newm an , 183
B.R. 239, 251 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) and In re T essi er , 190 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr . D.
Mon t.  1995) and finally agreed with the T essi er cou r t .  S ee Young, 82 F.3d at 1419.
73. 190 B.R . 39 6, 4 05 (B an kr . D.  Mon t.  199 5).
74. S ee Young, 82 F.3d at 1420. However, the Y ou n g court  refus ed to de fine
na t iona l security as n arr owly as the T essi er cou r t .  Id .
75. S ee id . 
76. S ee id .
77. S ee id .
voiding con t r ibu t ions  is  a lmos t  a  per  se burden  upon  the
exercise of re ligious fr eedom.69 After  accept ing t he  Young’s
a rgument  tha t  th e exercise of th eir religion would be
su bst an tia lly bur den ed by voidin g som e of their  reli giou s
cont r ibu t ion s, t he court  shifted t he bu rden  to th e tr ust ee to
prove that  § 548 satisfies the strict scrut iny standar d.70
In  order  t o meet  t he  fi r st  pr ong of s t r ict  scru t iny,  the
tr ust ee ar gued t ha t § 548 advan ced a compel l ing st a t e
interest.71 The t ru stee offered two compelling governm ent
interests  th at  were a dvan ced by § 548: (1) a llow in g debtors t o
get a  fres h  st a r t , a nd (2 ) pr otect in g t he cr ed it ors fr om
fraudulen t tra nsfers.72 Th e cou r t , r efe r r in g t o In re Tessier,73
a gr eed th at  allowing debtors t o get a fresh s ta rt  an d protect i ng
cred it or s fr om  fr a u dulent t ra nsfers  were governm en t
interests.74 However, the court  distinguished these interests
from compe lling in ter es t s s uch  as  n a t iona l secur ity a nd  held
tha t  pr oviding deb tor s wit h a  fresh s ta r t  and  protect ing
cred it ors d id  not  jus t ify  an  in fr ingement  on  F i r st  Amendment
rights.75 The  ma jority foun d t ha t n ullifying  § 548 as  it  r e la t e s t o
char i t able con t r ibu t ions  made  to r eligious orga niza tion s would
have such  a  m inor  e ffect  on  the  in t egr i ty  of t he  bankrup tcy
system  tha t  t here  was  no r ea l t h rea t to any  government
interest.76 Because the  cour t  held tha t  § 548 did not  advance  a
compellin g s t a t e in ter es t , it  did n ot  rea ch  a  de cis ion  on  whether
it  would meet the least  res t r ict ive  mea ns t es t . F in a lly , t he cou r t
held  th at  because § 548 put  a su bsta nt ial bur den  upon the
exercise of religious freedoms  an d failed to advan ce a
subst an t i a l sta te int erest , it violated  RFRA and  consequ ent ly,
the cir cu it  cour t  reve rse d t he d is t r ict  cour t ’s d ecis ion .77
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78. S ee T essi er, 1 90  B. R.  a t  405 (“[N]ot allowin g th e Tess iers t o tith e in t heir
Chapt er  13 Plan  imposes upon t heir exer cise of religion a subst ant ial bu r den  in  wh ich
the Trustee has failed to show the government  has a compelling interest . . . .”); In
re Newman,  183 B.R. 239,  248 (Bankr . D. Kan . 1995) (holding that  fraudulen t
tran sfer  s t a tut e doe s n ot s ub st an tia lly bu rd en  fre e ex er cise  of re ligion ); In  re Lees,
192 B.R. 756 (Ban k. D. Mont . 1994) (deter min ing t ha t t h e  fr a u d u len t  t r ansfer  s t a tu t e
is a gen era lly app licable la w an d does n ot violat e th e free  exer cise clau se). But see,
In  re Pa ckh am , 126  B.R. 6 03 (Ba nk r. D . Ut ah  1991 ) (hold ing  th at  tit hin g did  not
satisfy th e rea sona bly equiva len t  v a lue  st an da rd  an d is  th er efor e voi da ble ); In re
Na var ro,  83 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (concluding that  the court can  either
a ff irm  or re fuse t o confirm t he t ith ing pa ymen ts wit hout  violatin g th e con st it ut ion );
In  re Reyn olds, 83 B.R. 6 84 (Ban kr . W.D. Mo. 1988 ) (h o ld ing  tha t  chu rches  se rve  and
sa tisfy a de ep n eed a nd t ha t som e level of tit hin g is accept able); El lenb erg v. C hape l
Hill  Ha rv es te r C hu rch , In c., 5 9 B. R. 8 15 (B a n kr . N.D. Ga. 19 86) (holding th at
tra nsfer  to re ligious orga nizat ion sa tisfies t he r eason ably equ ivalen t  va lue s t anda rd
and is t he re fore  not  voida ble); In  re Stu rgeon , 51 B.R. 82 (Bankr . S.D. Ind. 1985)
(refusin g to a llow  con fir ma ti on  of a p la n t ha t p ro pos ed  don at ion  to a  chu rch ).
79. S ee In re Saun ders, 215 B.R. 800, 803-04 (Bankr . D. Mass. 1997); T essi er,
190 B.R. a t 4 05; Newm an , 183  B.R. a t 2 48; Lees , 192 B.R. at 756.
80. S ee supra  not es 28–3 6 an d accomp an ying t ext. 
81. S ee, e.g., In re Rive ra , 214  B.R. 1 01, 1 06 (Ba nk r. S .D.N .Y. 199 7); In re Gates
Communi ty Ch ap el of R och es te r,  In c., 2 12 B .R.  220 , 22 6 (Ba nk r.  W.D .N .Y. 19 97).
IV. ANALYSIS
 Recent  case s, in cludin g Y ou n g, ha ve ch ose n  to look  a t
reli giou s contr ibutions and § 548 in term s of con s t it u t iona l
rights.78 The a rguments  h inge on  in t e rpre t a t ions  of Supreme
Cou r t  de cis ion s d iscussin g the Establishment Clause an d the
Fr ee Exer cise Cla use.79 Debt ors a nd r eli giou s or ga n iza t ion s
have cited th e Free  Exer cise Clau se a nd  claime d t ha t t heir
First  Amendmen t  r ight  t o fr eedom of religion h as been
in fr in ged  upon  by bein g den ied t he  opport un ity t o su ppor t t heir
va r iou s re ligions  and  fol low what  th ey believe to be a
commandment of God . Con ver se ly,  cred it ors a nd t rus te es h ave
argued  tha t  a llowing money owed to them  to be used  to suppor t
reli gion  i s t an t amoun t  t o govern ment  suppor t  of r e ligion  and
violates  th e Est ablishm ent  Claus e.
S ince th e Young  de cis ion , RF RA h as been declar ed
un const itut ional as a pplied to states and st ate laws.80 After  the
Flores  decision ,  the Supreme Cour t  vaca ted and  remanded  the
Young decision  for re conside ra tion  in ligh t  of the Flores
de cis ion . Addition ally, ban kr up tcy court s, wit hou t a ddr essin g
t h e scope of the Flores decision, have refused to address RFRA
argumen t s by churches and religious debtors.81 Th is  Note
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82. Occasiona lly a  cour t  has  escaped the  F i r st  Amendment  Const i tu t iona l
quagmi re and used a  good-fa ith  te st  to d ecide  th e is su es r ais ed b y pr epe tit ion
cha rit able  dona tion s to a  religiou s orga niza tion . S ee, e.g., Packham , 126 B.R. at 603;
Navarro , 83 B. R. a t 3 48; Reyno lds, 83 B .R. a t 6 84; Ellenberg, 59 B.R. at 815;
S tu rgeon , 51 B.R. a t 82. 
83. T h e r e are currently a nu mber of proposed bills in congress that woul d
protect  religious contributions from being voided by  t h e tru stee.  S ee Th e Re ligiou s
L ibe r ty an d Ch ar ita ble D ona tion s P rot ect ion Act ,  S. 1244, 105th Cong. (1997); The
Reli giou s Libert y an d Cha rit able Don at ions P rote ction Act, H.R. 260 4, 105th  Cong.
(199 7); Rel igio us  Fa ir ne ss  in  Ba nk ru pt cy Act  of 199 7, H .R.  261 1, 1 05t h C on g. (1 997 ).
Although  th ese bills pr ovide th e prot ection for Religious  Libert ies a dvocat ed by th is
Note, tw o of th e t hr ee b ills  fail  to p rot ect  cre dit ors  from  ba d-fa it h con t r i bu t i on s to
churches in an a ttem pt to defraud t he cr e d it ors. See infra no t es  192-95 and
accompany ing t ext .
84. S ee supra  not es 55-77 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. 
ar gues  th at  th e Young cour t  cor rect ly ana lyzed the
const itu tion alit y of RFRA a nd  its  ap plicat ion to the  bankrup tcy
laws. However , even  if t he Young court  incorr ectly ana lyzed  the
cons t itu t iona l issues, and s t r ict  scru t iny p rotect ion  i s
un availa ble, th e sa me  re su lt could  be r ea ched  by ad optin g a
“good-fait h” t e st  i n r e la t ion to prepet i t ion  char i t able
cont r ibu t ion s t o reli giou s organizations.82 Adoptin g a good-faith
test  would s at isfy § 548’s in te n t  to p reven t  fraudu len t
conveyan ces while p rot ectin g th e exer cise of sincer e r eli giou s
beliefs. Al though  this  Note a dvocat es a  good-fait h t est , an d
such  a  t e st  s a t isf ies the int ent  of th e Fr au dulen t Conveyan ces
Act , a  good-fa it h  tes t  migh t  viola te t he clea r  mea nin g of the
st at ut e, an d ult imat ely Congres s will be required  to review
§ 548 a nd t he con st ruct ive  fraud p rovis ion .83
A. The Youn g Cou rt  Correct ly  An al yz ed  th e Con st it u ti onal
I ssues
 S in ce Congr ess p as sed R FRA, court s h ave s plit  over
whet her  RFRA is const itut ional an d whet her  RFRA can be used
to pr otect  pr ep et it ion  cont r ibu t ion s t o reli giou s organizations.
These were t he issu es th e Young court  correctly addressed.
In itia lly, th e Young cour t  found  tha t  RFRA was  cons t itu t iona l
as it applies t o federa l laws and t hen  app lie d t he s t r ict  scru t iny
stan dard,  esta blished by th e S herbert / Y oder line of cases , to
th e Ban kr upt cy Code.84
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85. S ee City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2170 (1997); Equal E mployment
Opp or tun i ty Com m’n v. C at holi c Un iv., 8 3 F .3d 4 55, 4 69-70  (D.C. C ir . 199 6); In  re
Saunders,  215 B.R. 800, 805-06 (Bankr . D. Mass. 1997); Hodge v. Magic Valley
Eva n g e li ca l Fr ee C hu rch , 200  B.R. 8 84, (Ba nk r. D . Id ah o 1996 ); In re Tessier, 190
B.R. 396,  407 (B an kr . D. M ont . (199 5); see also McConn ell, supra note 24.
86. S ee supra  not es 28-36 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. 
87. 117 S. C t.  215 7 (19 97).
88. S ee i d . a t 2170. For a critical analysis of the Flor es decision, see  gener ally
McConnell,  supra note 24.
89. S ee i d . at 2170-71.
90. S ee i d . at 2172. The exact application of the Supr eme Cour t’s decision is
now bein g conte ste d. See supra not e 85 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. 
91. S ee IN S v. C ha dh a, 4 62 U .S. 9 19, 9 34 (19 83); see also Regan  v.  Time, Inc.,
468 U.S . 641 , 652  (1983 ) (hold ing  th at  “a cour t s hou ld r efr ain  from  inv ali da tin g m ore
of th e st at ut e th an  is ne cessa ry”). 
92. S ee In  re Sau nder s, 215 B.R. 800, 806 (Ba nk r. D. Ma ss. 1997) (holding t ha t
RFRA creates pr ivate benefits tha t violate the Es tablishm ent Cla use ); Hodge v. Magic
Valley Evan gelical Free Chu rch, Inc., 200 B.R. 884, 899-902 (Bankr . D. Idaho 1996)
(argu ing th at  RFRA violat es th e Sepa ra tion of Power s by us u r pin g ju dici al  pow er );
In  re Te ss ier , 19 0 B. R. 3 96,  399  (Ba nk r.  D. M on t.  199 5) (h olding tha t RFRA violates
the Sep ara t ion  of P ower s by  t ryi ng t o fo rce  cou r t s to u se a  “judicially un ma na geable
t e s t ”) . 
1. RFRA  is constitutional
 The constit ut ionality of RFRA has  been h otly con te st ed
s ince th e bill pass ed in 1993.85 As previously explained,86 in City
of Boerne v. Flores,87 th e Su pr eme  Cour t h eld t h a t  RFRA was
uncons t it u t ion a l in  its ap plicat ion to stat es an d sta te law. 88
Specifically, the cou r t  held  tha t  RF RA was n ot  a  pr ope r  use  of
Congress’ enforcement  power un der  s ect ion five  of th e
Four t een th Amendm ent  because R FRA is n ot r eme dia l,
pr even tive  legisla t ion .89 Con se qu en t ly,  the S upr em e Cour t
invalidat ed ap plicat ion of RFRA to zoning a nd  oth er s ta te la w
issues.9 0 Al though  the Supreme Cour t  has  decla red  tha t  RFRA
is u ncons t itu t iona l  in  i t s app lica t ion  to s t a te l aw,  tha t  holding
does not  inva lida te t he e nt ire a ct; inva lid port ions  of a  s t a tu t e
can be severed  to avoid invalidat ing th e ent ire st at ut e.91
Althou g h th e na tu re of th e case , a dis pu te over  zoning
rest r ict ion s, did n ot give t he  Su pr em e Cour t a n opp ort un ity t o
review th e const itut ionality of RFRA as it a pplies to federal
law, an d specifically bankr upt cy, other  cour t s ha ve foun d RFRA
to be an  uncons t itu t iona l  viola t ion  of the Est ablishment Clause
and the Separa tion of Powers.92 Th e const itu tiona lity of RFRA
in the fede ra l con text  has b een qu es t ion ed and no doub t will
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93. The Supreme  Cour t  gr a nted cert iorari on the Young c a se , t hen  vacated  and
rema nded  for review in light of the Flor es decision. S ee Chr is t i ans v . Crys ta l
Evange l ica l Fr ee  Ch ur ch,  117  S. C t.  250 2 (19 97).
94. S ee In  re Na var ro, 83 B.R. 3 48, 351-52 (Ba nk r. E .D. Pa . 1988). 
95. U.S. CO N S T . amend I.
96. 403 U.S. 60 2 (1970). 
97. S ee id . 
98. S ee Navarro , 83 B.R. a t 351 -52. 
99. S ee id .  a t  348,  353-5 4; In re Gr een , 73 B .R. 8 93,  894 -95 (Ba nk r.  W.D.  Mich .
1987) (“To t h e ext en t t ha t t he  deb tor ’s ch ur ch is  ben efit ed [s ic], it  is a s a  re su lt of
the privat e choice of the individua l debtor int erposed be t w e en  t he  cour t  and  the
church . Such an  att enua ted benefit cannot be deem ed to confer the i m pr i m atu r  o f
s t a t e ap pr oval  on a ny  pa rt icul ar  re ligion  or u pon  re ligion  as  a w hole .”); see a lso Walz
v. Tax Comm’n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1971) (holdin g  t h at i nd ir ect
cont ri bu tion  to r eligious  contr ibut ions is  not  un const itu tion al). 
soon  be  the t opic of a  Su pr em e Cour t  de cision .93 However ,
unl ike its a pplication t o stat e law, RF RA s hou ld b e fou nd
con s t it u t iona l in it s a pplica tion  to feder al la w, inclu din g
ba nk ru pt cy.
a . R F R A does  not  v io lat e th e E st ab li sh m en t
Clause. Cr ed it ors of debt ors w ho have d ona ted  to reli giou s
orga niza t ion s a rgu e t ha t  not  a llow in g r ecove ry u nde r  § 548 of
the Ban kr up tcy Code violates the ir  fi r st  amendment
cons t itu t iona l rights.94 Cre dit ors a rgu e th at  allowin g the church
to keep m oney owed th em i s t an tamount  to forcing the cred it ors
to cont r ibu te t o the d ebtor ’s ch urch , which  is  a  viola t ion  of th e
Est ablishm ent  Claus e.95
The critical tes t  for Es ta blishmen t Clau se violations was
ini t i at ed in Lemon v. Kurtzman .96 In  Lem on, th e Cour t h eld
tha t  in  order  to su rvive  an  Es t ab li shment  Clause  a t t ack , a  l aw
must  (1) ha ve a secu la r  purpose , (2 ) have a  p r imary  effect  tha t
neith er  adva nces nor inh ibits religion, and (3) mus t n ot foster
excessive en tanglemen t  of the gover nmen t  in to reli gion .97
Cr ed it ors a rgue tha t  crea t in g a n  exce pt ion  to § 548  is , in  effect ,
suppor t ing the  advancemen t  of reli gion  and  devoid of a  secu la r
pur pose.98
Cre ditors’ Es ta blish men t Cla us e ar gum ent s sh ould fail for
two rea sons . Fir st , RFRA’s effect of protect ing pr epet ition
dona t ions in volve s n o governmen t  act ion .99 A cred itor  h a s a
righ t  t o r epaymen t  of a  deb t , bu t not  a  genera l r igh t  to have the
govern men t  direct a nd be r espons ible for oth er fin an cial
t r ansact ions in t he debt or’s life. The debt or deter mines  wher e
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100. S ee Navarro , 83 B.R. at 351-52.
101. S ee id .
102. S ee i d . 
103. S ee id . at  353-5 4; In  re Green , 73 B.R. 893, 894-95 (Bank r. W.D. Mich. 1987)
(“I f these funds did n ot go to the church, th ey would go toward th e debtors’ other
l iv ing exp en se s or  tow ar d p ay in g t he ir  cre dit or s, b ut  no t t o th e U ni te d S ta te s.”).
104. S ee Navarro , 83 B .R. a t 3 53-54 ; see also Walz , 397 U.S. 664 (up hol d ing tax
breaks for people who donate to charitable organizations as cons tit u t iona l  and no t  a
viola tion  of the E sta blish men t Cla use ). 
105. S ee City of Boerne  v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 215 7, 2171 (1997) (St even s, J .,
con cur ri ng ).
106. S ee EE OC v . Ca th olic U ni v. of Am ., 8 3 F .3d  455 , 47 0 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding  th at  RFRA does n ot violate  th e Est ablish men t Cla use , but  is a “legislat ively
man dated  acco mm oda ti on  of th e e xer cise  of re ligi on ”).
107. S ee generally Hobbie v . Unemployment  Appeals  Comm’n,  480 U.S. 136, 144
(1987) (ho ld ing  tha t  gran t ing unemploymen t  benefits to an em ployee who was fired
for  re fus in g t o wor k on  he r S ab ba th  is n ot a  viol at ion  of th e Es ta bli sh me nt  Cla us e);
Walz , 397 U .S. a t 6 75-76  (up hold ing  ta x br ea ks  for peop le wh o don at e t o re ligiou s
or ga ni za ti on s); see also McConn ell, supra note 24, at  169.
108. Cor por at ion  of the P res iding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329 (1987)
(holding  th at  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, wh ich exem pts  religious  organ ization s from Tit le
VII’s prohibition against discriminat ion in employment ba sed on rel igion , does  not
violate  th e E st ab lis hm en t C la us e).
the mon ey is s p en t  or  to whom i t  is  to be g iven .100 The deb tor
decides whethe r  and  how much  money to give the  church .101
Second, cr ed it ors on ly h ave a  cla im  aga in st  the d ebtor , a nd n ot
a  posses sory  in te res t  in  th e m oney. 102 There fore , the
govern men t  i s not  forcing credi tor s to dona te  to the  church ,  bu t
instead l eav ing  them withou t  an unsa t is fi ed  cl a im.103
Ult ima te ly, it  is clear that  the money is not government funds,
nor  is  it  money t aken  di rect ly fr om the cred it or  and given  to the
church  an d t her efore does n ot violat e  the Es tabl ishment
Claus e.104
Alth ough  in a  concurr ing opin ion in Flores , Ju stice Steven s
wou ld have fou nd RFRA u nconst it u t ion a l ba se d on  the
Es tabl ishment  Claus e,105 he was n ot  join ed  by a ny of th e  ot h er
Jus t ices. Desp it e J ust ice S teve ns’ ar gu men t , RF RA is  not  a
viola t ion  of the  Estab li shment Clau se , bu t  is  a  const it u t ion a l
accommoda t ion  of reli giou s p ract ice.106 The government h as a
lon g h istory of providing accommodations for the free exercise
of reli gion .107 Congr ess  ha s gr an te d t ax exe mpt ion s t o reli giou s
orga niza t ion s an d ha s exe m pt ed r eli giou s or ga n iza t ion s fr om
Title  VI I  proh ibi t ion  aga ins t  d iscr imina t ion  in  employmen t  on
the basi s of r eligion .108 Such  accommodat ions  a re not
uncons t itu t iona l , bu t  provide a legitimate government pu rpose
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109. Id .
110. S ee i d . at 335 (“Under  the L em on  an alysis, it  is a pe rm issible legisla tive
purpose to allevia te sig n i fi ca n t  gover nm en ta l in te rfe re nce  wit h t he  ab ilit y of re ligiou s
org an iza tion s to d efin e a nd  car ry  ou t t he ir  re ligi ou s m iss ion s.”).
111. S ee i d . 
112. S ee Hodge v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Ch urch, In c., 200 B.R. 884, 901
(Bankr . D. Id ah o 1996 ); In re Tess ier, 1 90 B.R. 396, 406-07  (Bankr. D.  Mon t.  199 5).
113. S ee EE OC v . Ca th olic U ni v. of Am . , 83 F.3d 455, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding  that “the more natu ral reading of the Act’s provisio n s l ea d s  u s to conclude
tha t  Congre ss’s objective in  ena cting t he st at ut e was  to over t u r n  the  e ff ec t s o f t he
S m it h decision, not  th e decision it self ”).
114. S ee 42 U .S. C. § 2 000 bb(a )(4) (19 96).
of avoiding unn ecessar y governm ent al ent an glemen t  in
reli giou s act ivities .109 RFRA, pa rt icular ly in  the  bankrup tcy
conte xt,  simply provid es  a  const it u t ion a l a ccommoda t ion  to the
Bankrup tcy Code to prot e ct  r eligious freedoms  an d preven t t he
unnecessa ry burdening of the free exercise of sincer e r eli giou s
beliefs.
The Es tabl ishment  Clause does  not  requ i re tha t  the
govern men t  sever a ll conta ct with r eligious orga nizat ions, but
requ ires  on ly tha t  Congre s s m u st  not  advoca te  a  pa r t i cu la r
poin t of view or  reli gion .110 In passin g RF RA, Congr es s h as n ot
provided suppor t  for  any  par t icu la r  r el ig ion  or  denomina t ion .
RFRA prot ect ions  apply to a l l r e ligious  organ iza t ions  and  thei r
members. As long as Congress is neutral and r efuses to
p romote an y par ticular  religion or p oint  of view, th e
Esta blishment  Clause is not violated.111
Fin ally,  i t  is  impor tan t  to remember  tha t  RF RA only
r e t urns to the  ru le  espoused  in  S herbert.  If applying the st r i ct
scru t iny sta nda rd t o laws  tha t  bu rde ned  the exer cise of r eli gion
did  not violate th e const itut ion for t he a ppr oxima tely fifty year s
S herbert was t he law, it s eems count erint uitive to believe tha t
the same sta ndar d suddenly violates the Esta blishment  Clause
when  st at ut orily m an da te d by Congress. If S herbert d id  not
viola te t he E st ablishmen t  Cla use  then  nei ther  doe s R FRA.
b. R F R A does not violate Separation of Powers
principles. Cour t s t ha t  have  found  RFRA to be an
uncons t itu t iona l violation of the sepa ra t ion  of powers  have
cha ract e r ized RFRA as  an  uncons t it u t iona l a t t empt  by
Congress to define First Amendment protections.112 These
de cis ion s misconstr ue t he in t e n t  of RF RA. 113 There  is  no
quest ion  th at  Congress did n ot supp ort t he S m ith  de cis ion .114
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115. S ee Zurche r  v.  St an ford Da ily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (holding that the F irst,
Four th an d F our te en th  Ame nd me nt s fa iled  to p rov ide  ad ded  pr ote cti on fr om s ea rch
by police  officer s); cf. 42 U.S.C. 2000aa (“Notwithsta nding a ny other  law, it sha ll be
un lawful for a govern men t officer or emp loyee, in conne ction  wit h t he  inv est iga tion
or  prosecut ion o f a crimin al offense, t o sear ch for or seize a ny work  produ ct ma ter ials
possessed by a  pe r son  r easonab ly  be li eved  to h a v e a  p u rpose  to d iss em ina te  to t he
public  a n ewsp ape r, book, br oadca st, or oth er s imilar  form of publi c
communica t ion  . . . . ”).
116. S ee E m ployment Div., Dep’t of Huma n Resour ces of Oregon v. Smith , 494
U.S. 872 , 87 8-79  (199 0).
117. F o r othe r exa mples  of where C ongr ess  has  r esponded to  a Supreme  Cour t
decis ion  by providin g grea ter  prot ection for fun dam ent al r ight s, see  Un ited S ta tes v.
Bauer , 75 F.3 d 1366, 13 75 (9th  Cir. 19 96), cert . d eni ed , 11 7 S .Ct . 99 5 (19 97).
However, th at  does not mea n t ha t Congress  ha s usu rped
judicia l pow er . Unlik e t he F our teen th  Amen dm en t , wh ich
limit s congre ssion a l power  over  st a tes  to rem ed ia l or
enforcement  power, in areas of federal concern Congress h as
the power  to make subst ant ive changes in the law. If Congress
had the power to create the Bankru ptcy Code, it s hou ld h ave
the power to am end or limit  th e Bankru pt cy Cod e t o pr otect
First  Amendmen t  fr eedoms . Moreover, if Congre ss ca n en gage
in  piecem ea l r evi sion  of feder a l legis la t ion , it  can  a lso take a
global appr oach seeking t o safeguar d aga inst  all encroachm ent s
on  reli giou s fr eedom s.
Addit iona lly, Congr ess ha s regu larly r esponded t o Suprem e
Cou r t  de cis ion s b y cr ea t in g a  h igh er  th res hold  pr otect ion  for
individual righ ts  th an  th e Const itu tion  requires.115 By r u lin g on
a  cons t itu t iona l  is sue, t he  Supreme Cour t e st ab lish es t he  righ ts
cons t itu t iona l ly manda ted. However , t he Const it u t ion  doe s n ot
pr ohibit  Congr ess from grant ing more protection for freedoms.
The S m ith  holdin g allows t he gover nmen t  to in fr in ge on
reli giou s fr eedom s a s long a s t he burde nin g of t he r eli giou s
activity  “i s not  the  ob ject  of the  [l aw] bu t  mere ly  the inciden ta l
effect  of a gen era lly app licable an d oth er wise va lid pr ovision.”116
The S m ith  decision does not pr ohibit th e federal governm ent
from gra nt ing gr eat er p rot ection for r eligiou s r ights. Congress
is ce r ta in ly free to set t he st an dar d for federa l law higher  an d
r equ ir e an y law  bur den ing r eligious  freed oms t o sat isfy a s t r i ct
scru t iny standa rd.117 Self-restrictive guidelines  pr ovid in g m ore
protection do not violate th e separation of powers.
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118. S ee, e.g., Hodge v. Ma gic Valley Evan gelical F r ee Chur ch, 200 B.R. 884, 895-
96 (Ban kr . D. I da ho 1 996); In  re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 405  (Ba nk r.  D. M on t.  199 5);
In  re Fau lkner , 165 B.R. 644, 648 (W.D. Mo. 1994); In  re Newm an, 183 B.R. 239, 251
(Bankr . D. Ka n. 1 995); In re Gr ee n,  73 B .R.  893 , 89 5 (Ba nk r.  W.D . Mi ch.  198 7).
119. S ee In  re Youn g, 8 2 F .3d  140 7, 1 414  (8t h C ir . 19 96).
120. S ee id .  at 1416-17. This argument  has been used a nd is more app lica ble in
a  Cha pte r 13  pet ition  for ba nk ru ptcy, w her e th e tr us tee  objects  to t he  ap pr ova l of a
paymen t  plan that  includes making contributions to religious organizations. S ee
T essi er, 190 B.R. a t 397 , 405. 
2. RFRA and  the Sherber t / Yoder  line of cases protects
pr epet it ion  rel igi ous d onat ion s
 After  cor rect ly dete rmin ing tha t  RF RA was con st it u t ion a l in
its  applicat ion to federa l law, the Young cour t wa s requ ired by
RFRA to re tu rn  to the S h e rber t/ Y oder l ine of cases to
dete rmine whe th er t he ch ar ita ble cont ribut ions could be voided
by th e ban kr upt cy trus tee. Applying the S herbert / Y oder r u le  t o
the Young  case requ i res  tha t  the cour t  app ly  the s t r ict  scru t iny
s t anda rd to the Bankrupt cy Cod e, s pe cifica lly  § 548. T he s t r ict
scru t iny standar d requ ires t he court  to deter mine (1) wheth er
voiding char it able  con t ributions to a religious organization is a
subs tan t ia l burden  on  an individual’s exercise of religion, an d if
it  is a substant ial burden on the exercise of religion then  (2)
whet her  the Bankru ptcy Code and specifically § 548 advances a
compellin g government inter est and is t h e lea st  re st rict ive
means for ach ievin g th a t compelling governm ent in ter est. One
of the difficulties in app lying RF RA to pr otect p rep etit ion
char i t able donat ions is th at  RFRA, like Sh erbert, fails  t o define
“substan tially burden” or “compelling state interest.”
a. Preventin g religious contributions is a substantial
burden  on the free exerci se of religious freedom s. Since RFRA
was pass ed, cour ts h ave split over wh eth er  void ing
con t r ibu t ion s to r eligious  orga niza t i on s  con s t it u t es a
subs tan t ia l bur den  on t he ir e xer cise of religious freedoms.118 In
Young, t he  church  cla imed  tha t  the Youn gs  were d evou t
mem bers  of the ir  church  and  tha t  pay ing t i th ing  or  making
cont r ibu t ion s is a funda m ent al a ctivity in  exercisin g th eir
reli giou s rights.11 9  Consequently, the chur ch asserted that
forcing t h e church  to r e tu rn the  dona ted money to the  t ru s t ee
would  in effect be de n yi n g the  Youngs  the oppor tun ity  to
p ract i ce the requirements of their religious beliefs.120 Alth ough
the major it y a ccepted t he se a rgu me nt s a s const itu tin g a
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121. S ee Young, 82 F .3d a t 1 421-2 2 (Bogu e, J ., dis sen tin g); see also In  re Bloch,
207 B.R. 9 44, 9 51 (Ba nk r. D . Colo. 1 997); Newm an , 183 B.R. a t 251 . 
122. S ee Young, 82 F .3d a t 1 421-2 2; Newm an , 183 B.R. a t 251 . 
123. 200 B.R . 88 4 (Ba nk r.  D. I da ho  199 6).
124. Id . a t  895 (citing H obbie v. Unemployment  Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136,
140-41 (1987 ); see Sherbe r t  v.  Verne r , 374 U.S . 398,  404 (1 963)); see als o Duclos,
supra  note 23, at  693-95.
125. S ee Hodge , 200 B.R. at 895.
126. S ee, e.g., Young, 83 F .3d a t 1 410; Hodge , 200  B.R. a t 8 95-96 ; In  re Tess ie r ,
190 B.R. 3 96, 4 05 (Ba nk r. D . Mon t. 1 995); In  re Newman , 183 B.R.  239,  251 (Bankr .
D. Kan. 1995); In re Fa ulk ner , 165 B.R. 644 , 648 (Ban k. W.D . Mo. 1994); In re Green ,
73 B.R . 89 3, 8 95 (B an kr . W.D . Mi ch.  198 7).
127. This  would be especially true in a  Chapt er 13 case where  t h e court refused
to appr ove a pa ymen t pla n beca use  it inclu ded r eligious cont ribut ions. S ee, e.g.,
T essi er, 190 B.R. at 405.
subs tan t ia l bu rde n , t he d is se n t  and ot her  cour t s con tend tha t
the bu rden  is  minor .121 Those cour ts  as ser t t ha t d ebt ors a re s till
able  to cont ribu t e before  and a fte r  bankrup tcy  and tha t  they
can  find ot he r w ays  to exer cise r eligiou s  fr e edoms  tha t  do not
defrau d their creditors.122
In  Hodge v. Magic Valley Evangeli cal  Free Ch urch ,123 t he
cour t h eld th at  “a su bsta nt ial bur den u pon religion exists when
the st a tu te: (1) requ ir es  an  in divid ua l t o r efra in fr om doing
someth ing re qu ire d by h i s or her  religious beliefs, or; (2) forces
an  in divid ua l t o choose  between following t he p recep ts  of his
reli gion  or  her  re ligion a nd  forfeitin g ben efits , . . .”124 A
re gula t ion  tha t  su bs tan t ia lly  bu rde ns t he exer cise of r eli gion
will prohibit a n ind ividual from exercising religious beliefs or
force th e ind ividual t o choose bet ween  pa rt icipat ion in a
govern men t  progra m or t he exercise of his rights and th e
pr act ice of h is  reli gion .125
As th e Young cour t correctly foun d, § 548 substa n t ially
burdens th e free  exer cise of religion in  tw o ways . Fir st , § 548
preven t s a  debtor from following religious dicta tes. Sin cere
reli giou s be lie ver s s ee  t it h in g n ot  as an opt ion, but as a
commandment from God, and a  requ ir em en t  of their  reli gion .126
By forcing the  church  to r e t urn  the  money to the  t rustee,  the
effect  is  as i f the d ebtor  had neve r  made  the d ona t ion . Th e cou r t
would  the refore be  nu lli fyin g r eli giou s act ivity. 127 Second, § 548
imposes a s ubs ta nt ial bu rd en on  religious  debt ors by forcing
t hem  to choose between protecting their church and the
dona t ions they made to the  church  and th e reli ef p rovid ed  for
a l l de bt ors u nde r  the Bankrupt cy Cod e. I f t rust ees a re a llow ed
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128. S ee Hodge ,  200 B.R. at 895-96 (recognizing that t he Hodges “would n o t  have
filed for  bankruptcy r e li ef  had  they known  tha t  P la in t if f [ the  t rus t e e]  wo u ld  seek  to
avoid th eir  re ligi ou s t it he s”).
129. Id . at 896.
130. S ee id . at  897; Newm an , 183  B.R. a t 2 52; T essi er, 190  B.R. a t 4 05; In  re
Na var ro,  83 B .R.  348 , 35 3 (Ba nk r.  E. D. P a.  198 8).
131. S ee supra  not e 13 0; see also Duclos, supra  note 23, at  698-99.
132. S ee Hodge , 200  B.R. a t 8 97; see,  e.g., Newm an , 183  B.R. a t 2 52; T essi er, 190
B.R. at  405; Navarro , 83 B.R. at 353.
t o void  conveya nces t o reli giou s or ga n iza t ion s,  som e r eli giou s
deb tor s would r efus e t o file for b an kr up tcy.128 Section 548
the refore denies  r eligious debtors participation in, and th e
bene fi t s of, bank ru ptcy. As th e Hodge cou r t  held, “fina ncia lly
str app ed debtors s hould n ot be subjected to th e su b st a n t i a l
p res su re of choosing  between  eit her  de bt  reli ef on  the on e hand,
or  genera t ing  a  l aw su it  aga in s t  their chu rch for a m oney
judgment on  the  othe r .”129 Requirin g debtors t o make s uch  a
choice i s a  su bs tan t ia l bu rde n  on the fr ee  exe rcise of r eli gion .
b. The Ban kru pt cy Code is  not a  com pel ling gov ern m ent
interest. Since voiding rel ig ious  con t r ibu t ions  is  a  subs tan t ia l
bur den on t he free  exercise of religion, tru stees  mus t  show tha t
§ 548 adva nces a compelling government inter est and is the
least re st rict ive m ea ns  for ach ievin g th at  governmenta l
pur pose. Credit ors ha ve offered several government inter ests a s
compellin g in  an  a t t empt  to ju s t ify  the  Bankrup tcy Code an d it s
bur den  on  the free exe rcise of r eli gion .130 These include (1)
pres erving the bankr uptcy system, (2) allowing debtors to
escape r epr essive  debt  an d st ar t over , an d (3) prot ectin g
credi tor s from econ omic los s. 131 Court s ar e split on whet her
these i n te rest s jus tify bu rd enin g religious  freed oms by voidin g
charitable contributions.132
The flaw in  th e ar gumen ts by creditors who suggest that t he
Bankr up tcy Code sa tis fies a comp elling govern men t in ter est  is
tha t  those arguments focus on the Bankr uptcy Code as a  whole,
and not  specifically on § 548. Moreover , credit ors d o not weigh
the impact  of § 548 on all religious debtors, bu t  limit  the  impact
t o the individual debtor. Certainly the Bankrupt cy Code, th e
relief it pr ovides debt ors, an d th e protection it pr ovides
creditors, i s a  governmen t  i n te rest . However , pr otectin g
cont r ibu t ion s to reli giou s orga n izations m ade by sincere
reli giou s debt ors w ould  not  th rea ten  the purpos es  of th e
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133. S ee Hodge , 200 B.R. at  898 (“[T]he in ter ests  adva nced by  th e ba nk ru pt cy
system  are  not  compell ing  as  tha t  t erm has been developed under F irst Amendm ent
and RF RA ju ri spr ud en ce. . . . M ore over , de ny ing  re cover y of this class of transfers,
when  no  actual  fraud is  s how n, w ill h ave  lit tle  dis cer na ble e ffect on  th e in te gr ity  of
the bankrupt cy system, or on the amounts received by most creditors th r ough  tha t
sys te m. ”). 
134. S ee i d .
135. This  Note suggests t hat  a good-faith test  for voiding char itable con t r ibu t ions
donated  with  actu al int ent  to defra ud cr editor s could be a  less r estr ict i ve  m e a ns for
ach ieving the b ank rupt cy purposes and st ill protect the free exercise of sincere
re ligious beliefs. 
136. S ee Hodge , 200  B.R. a t 8 98; see, e.g., 11 U.S .C. § 547(c) (1996). 
137. S ee Hodge , 200 B.R. a t 898 . 
138. S ee supra  Par t IV.A.1.
139. RFRA specifically reverts  back to the Sh erbert  ru le. See supra no te 26 and
accompany ing text . 
140. S ee Sh er ber t v . Vern er, 374 U.S. 398, 398 (1963). This line of cases also
includes Hob bie v . Un em ploy m ent  Ap peal s Com m iss ion  of F l or id a , 107 S. Ct. 1046
(1987) (holding  tha t it was u nconstitut ional to deny un em ploy me nt  ben efit s t o pla in ti ff
who had lost her  job because she r efused to work on Satu rday, her  S a b ba t h ) and
Thom as v. R eview  Boa rd  of th e In di an a E m ploy m ent  S ecur ity  Div ision ., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (concluding that  the F ree Exercise clause prohibits denying u nem ploymen t
benef it s ba se d u pon  re ligi ou s b eli efs ). Th is i s a lso  th e r ul e t ha t R FR A at te m p t s  t o re-
create.  S ee 42 U.S .C. § 2000bb (1996 ). 
Bankrup tcy Code.133 Allowin g r eli giou s con t r ibu t ion s w ould  not
su bst an tia lly reduce th e am ount  of money recoverable by
credit ors.134 The Bankrupt cy Code would continue to provide
needed  relief and would provide only s ligh t ly r ed uced  pr otect ion
for  cred it ors.  Even  if § 548 sat isfied a compelling governm ent
interest, it  is n ot  t he lea st  re st rict ive m ea ns  of sat isfying t ha t
govern men t  interest.135 Congress has crea ted  numerous
exce pt ion s to the Bankru ptcy Code avoidance statutes.136
Section  548 cou ld  and s hould  pr ovi de  a n exception for sincere
reli giou s believers w h o a ct  in  good  fa i th  wi thou t  fraudu len t
in ten t .137 The only substantial change to the Bankr uptcy Code
wou ld  be  tha t  it  wou ld  pr otect  the fr ee  exe rcise of r eli gion .
3. RFR A’s good-faith test prevents abu se
 S in ce RF RA is con s t it u t ion a l a s  it  a p pl ie s t o federa l
issues,138 it rever ts t he free exercise deba te back  to the
S herbert / Y oder law.139 The S herbert/ Yoder line of cases made
any law th at  bur dened t he free exercise of r eli giou s fr eedom s
uncons t itu t iona l un les s i t  sa t is fied  the com pelling interest
t e st .140 The  ru le in  S herbert, however, does not provide a
blank et  pr otection  for a ll religious beliefs. Rath er, th e S herbert
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141. Mason , supra  note 13, at  206-07.
142. Additiona lly, c ou r t s  ca n  a n d  sh ou l d a b st a i n fr om  an swer ing the
cons t i tu t iona l quest ions a nd s ear ch for a r esolut ion of the is sue s with out r esort ing t o
cons t i tu t iona l ques tions . The S upr eme C ourt  ha s held  th at  th e constit ut ion a li ty o f an
i ssue shou ld not b e add res sed u nless  th ere is  no oth er s olut ion. S ee J ean  v . Ne lson ,
472 U.S . 846 , 854  (1985 ) (hold in g  t h at it  is a  car din al p ri ncip le gu idin g fede ra l cour ts
tha t  constitutional issues sh ould not be rea c h ed  u nles s a bs olu te ly n ece ss ar y);
Ashwander  v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Bran deis , J ., concur rin g) (“The  Cour t
will not  pa ss u pon  a con st itu tion al q ue st ion a lth oug h  p rope r ly  pre sen ted  by  the
record, if th er e is  al so p re se nt  som e ot he r g rou nd  up on w hi ch t he  case may be
disposed of.”).
143. S ee, e.g., In re Andrad e, 213 B.R. 765, 772 (Bankr . E. D. Ca l. 199 7); In re
Na var ro,  83 B.R. 348, 357 (Bankr . E.D. Pa. 1988); Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Har vester
Church , In c., 59 B .R. 81 5, 81 9 (Ba nk r. N .D. G a. 1 986); W ilson  v. Upreach Ministries,
24 B.R . 97 3, 9 78 (B an kr . N .D.  Te x. 1 982 ).
test  att empts t o protect only sincere religious beliefs. In
ap plyin g S herbert, court s consid er  th e following:
(1 ) [w ]h e t h e r  a  d e fe n d a n t ’s  b el ie f,  or  c on d u c t  m o ti va ted  by
be lie f, is sin cere ly h eld; (2) wh et he r a  defe nd an t’s belief, or
con d u ct  mot iva ted  by bel ief, is r elig iou s  in  n a t u r e; (3 ) w h e th e r
a  s t a t e  r egu la t ion  imposes  a  bu r den  u pon  a  de fen d a n t ’s  be l ie f
or  co n du c t; (4 ) w h e t h er  t h e r e i s a  l es s  ob t r u si ve  fo rm  o f
regu la t ion  ava i l ab le  to  the  s t a t e .141
S herbert’s sincer it y r equ ir em en t  wou ld  pr otect  cred it ors fr om
bad-fa i th  conveyances  to reli giou s orga niza tion s a nd  would
provide the n eede d p rotect ion  for  re ligious  freedoms . RFRA and
S herbert would fulfill th e inten t of § 548, avoiding frau dulen t
conveyances.
B. A Possible S olu ti on
 If there is a  flaw in th e Y ou n g  decision  it  i s not  i n its
ana lysis of RFRA, but r at her  in its a na lysis of § 548. Even  if
Y oung was wrongly decided and the Supreme Court decides
tha t  RF RA does  not  prot ect p re pet ition  re ligious d ona tion s, t he
Young court  could st ill re a ch its  original conclusion by
emp loying a  more r eli giou sly s en si t ive  in ter pr et a t ion  of
§ 548.142 This  Not e suggest s th at  a good-faith t est s hould be
read into § 548, and th at  t h e Young cour t  cou ld have reached
the sam e resu lt of protecting religious free doms by us ing a
good-fa i th  test adopted by other courts.143 Indeed , some cour t s
migh t  decide t o pred icat e th eir decision on t he r eligiously
sen sit ive int erp ret at ion of § 548 su ggest ed h ere in.
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144. 11 U. S.C . § 54 8(a )(1) (19 96).
145. 11 U. S.C . § 54 8(a )(2) (19 96).
146. S ee Up reach  Mi ni st ries , 24  B.R . a t 9 78 (B an kr . N .D.  Te x. 1 982 ).
147. S ee In  re Young, 82 F .3d 1407, 1 414 (8th  Cir. 19 96). 
148. 11 U. S.C . § 54 8(d )(2)(a ) (199 6).
149. S ee Y o u n g,  82 F. 3d  at  141 4 (“The chur ch argues t hat  ‘value’ includes
in dir ect  econ omi c ben efit s a nd  th at  th e de bt ors  receive d ‘val ue ’ in t he  form o f ta x
deduc t ions for charita ble contributions, church membersh ip and spirit ua l counselin g,
and,  more conc ret e ly , acces s t o c h u r ch  facili tie s be cau se con tr ibu tion s fr om t he
debto r s and others h elped pay for the church’s opera tin g expe ns es. ”); In  re Newman ,
183 B.R. 239, 246-47 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (holding that  an exchan ge of value does
no t ha ve to be dolla r for dollar  exchan ge, but  th at  fulfillin g  a  deep  felt  re ligiou s
obliga tion  is n ot r ea son ab ly eq uiv ale nt  val ue ); In  re P a ck h a m , 126 B.R. 603, 606-07
(Bankr . D. Utah  1991) (deciding that t he denial of a tem ple  re comm end is not bur den
enou gh  to ove rr ule  object ion of b an kr up tcy t ru st ee); In  re Navar ro, 83 B.R. 348, 356
(Bankr . E.D. P a. 1988) (“Our Society recognizes and some m ight say encoura ges
religiou s affili at ion a nd  pa rt icipa tion  in r eligi ous  act ivit ies . Ma ny  per son s of va ri ous
domina t ions bel ieve  th at  re ligio us  en dea vor s a re  ver y m uch  a p a r t  of  the a ctivities
necessa ry for  t he  ma in tenance  and  suppor t  o f an  individua l  and his  or  he r fa mi ly.”);
1. Recognizing tha t § 548 should n ot be applied to charitable
donat ions
 The two su bs ect ion s of § 54 8(a ) are dist inguish ed by the
culpa bility  th ey r equ ire. Subsection one requires that th e
deb tor  main ta in  an  “actua l  in ten t  to h inder , delay, or  defraud
any ent ity . . .”144 Conver sely, su bsect ion tw o does not  req uir e
any level of culpa bility, bu t in st ead  finds  “const ru ctive fra ud ” if
(1) th e debtor was insolvent an d (2) received “less than a
rea sona bly equ ivalen t va lue in  exch a n ge for  su ch
t r a nsfer . . . .”145 In m an y cases wher e conveyan ces were voided
un der  subsection two, ther e was s ome evid en ce of a ctua l
fraud.146
Un der  § 548(a)(2), the t hr esh old issu e in Young and in most
char it able  don a t ion s cases is whet her  th e tr an sfer w as  ma de in
excha nge  for rea sona bly equ ivalen t  value. 147 This  que st ion
gener ally res olves i t se lf in to two s ubissu es: (1) wheth er t her e
was an  “exchange” a nd (2 ) wh et her  the exch ange w as for
“r eas ona bly equivalent  value.” Section 548 defines value a s
“proper ty,  or  sa t is fact ion  or  secur ing of a  p resent  or  an teceden t
debt  of the d ebt or, bu t d oes not  inclu d e a n  un performed
promise to fu rn is h  s up p or t  to the debtor  or  to a r ela t ive  of th e
deb tor ; . . .”148 Alt hough  reli giou s or ga n iza t ion s h ave been  very
crea tive  in tr ying to justify the m oney they r eceive and  expla in
the benefit th ey confer in t erm s of th e § 548 d efin it ion ,149 t he
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In  re Rey no lds , 83  B.R . 68 4, 6 85 (B an kr . W.D . Mo.  198 8) (“There i s no  doubt  t ha t ,
t o many , churches (or religions) serve and satisfy a deep and abiding need that exists
somewhere in  eit he r t he  consciousness or  unconsciousness  of homo sapiens. By
what ever nam e or rite, man  has a nd will seek some enti t y  or  i n st it u t ion  tha t  answers
the un an swe ra ble  qu es ti ons  an d a ss ua ges  th e u na ss ua gea ble  dou bt s a nd  conce rns of
our  hu ma n exis ten ce.”); Ellen ber g v. Cha pel H ill Ha rves ter  Chu rch , Inc., 59 B.R. 815,
818-19 (Bank r. N.D . Ga. 1986) (holdin g th at  counselin g services and a ccess t o
re ligious services satisfy the reasonably equivalent value stan dard an d a r e the re fo re
no t voida ble); Up reach  Mi ni st ries , 24  B.R . a t 9 79 (“ The mora le of  the employees and
the good will of all of those people with whom MBFA dealt was r easonably enha nced
by the  con t inua t ion  of the  char i t able cont ri bu tion s. Wh et he r it  is ca lled  ‘good wi ll’ or
wheth er  some other ter m is applie d t he  comp lia nce  wit h t he  ma nd at e fr om t he
inco rpora to r s i n  mak ing  the char i t a bl e con t r ibu t ions  each  mon th,  not  w iths t and ing
i t s i n solvency during a portion of the period, establishes th at a  reasona bly equivalent
va lue was  receive d by MBF A in excha nge for t he ch allen ged t ra nsfer s.”). 
150. S ee Young, 82 F.3d at 1414-15.
151. S ee i d .
152. S ee N avarro, 83 B .R. a t 3 56-57 ; Reyno lds, 83 B .R. a t 6 85; Ellenberg, 59 B.R.
a t  818-1 9; Up reach  Mi ni st ries , 24 B.R. a t 979 . 
153. 24 B.R . 97 3 (Ba nk r.  N. D. T ex.  198 2).
154. S ee id . at 979.
155. S ee Ellenberg, 59 B.R. at 818-19.
156. S ee id .; Reyno lds, 83 B.R. at 685.
Young cour t ,  and most oth er cour ts , refu se t o recognize t he k ind
of benefits a  chur ch confers u pon its m embers.1 50 Even  i f the
cour t s found  that  t h e se rvices offe red  by t he ch urch  were of
reasonably equ ivalen t va lue, m an y cour ts  refu se t o find th at
the t r ansfe r  wa s “in  exch ange for ” t hose services because
churches usu ally offer th eir ser vices rega rdless  of whet her  th e
members con t r ibu te to the  church  or  not .151
Other court s have looked at the issue of value and held tha t
the services provided by religious  organ iza t ions  a re of rea l
value. 152 In  Wi lson  v.  Up rea ch  Min is tr ies ,153 t he  cour t  he ld  tha t
valu e includes th in gs  other  than  tangib le goods , a nd t ha t  good
will and  providing a s ervice were of rea sonably equivalen t
value. 154 Still other courts have held that t he counse ling a nd
suppor t  provided by the chur ch met the value requirements.155
Some court s h ave  held  th at  re ligions p rovide  couns elin g an d
suppor t  tha t  is of rea l valu e jus t lik e ps ychia tr ist s, wh o char ge
s u bs t an t i a l rat es to provide answers to troubling questions.156
Indeed, it is  illogical to a rgu e t ha t m en ta l, em otiona l, an d
sp ir i tua l su pp or t  is  va lu able  wh en  pr ovid ed  by a  doct or , bu t  not
when  provided by a chur ch. However, it  is still t he ca se  tha t
valu e pr ovid ed  by r eli giou s or ga n iza t ion s is im possible t o define
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157. S ee M a ry J o Newbor n Wiggin s, A S ta tu te of D isb elief ?: Clashing E thical
Imp erat ives  in Fr aud ulen t T ran sfer La w, 48 S.C. L. RE V. 771 , 78 5 (19 97) (“ The ‘value’
contemplated  by th e Code is e conomic, and t ha t con te mp lat ed b y th e ch ur ch is  non -
econ omi c. The va lue ga ined fr om tit hin g come s fr om t he  spi ri tu al s at isfa ction  one
receives from being faithful to God and k eeping  God ’s commandm ents.”). Chur ches
a re al so in  a ca tch -22,  wh er e in  or de r t o m ai nt ai n t he ir  ta x-ex em pt  an d w ri te -off
s t a tus they mu st not confer a benefit, but if they fail to confer a ben efit  dona t ions
made  to th em a re p oten tia lly voidable . S ee Her na ndez v.  Com mi ss ioner  o f In te rna l
Revenue,  490  U. S. 6 80,  690 -94 (1 989 ).
158. S ee, e.g., In re Pa ckh am , 12 6 B. R. 6 03,  606 -08 (B an kr . D.  Ut ah  199 1).
159. S ee supra  not e 149. 
160. In  f ac t , many  churches  agree  that  i t  is  impossi ble t o pla ce a  val ue  on
and does  not  sat isfy the d efin it ion  of va lu e in  the Bankrupt cy
Code.157
Even  if the ser vices pr ovid ed  by t he r eli giou s or ga n iza t ion s
a re valu able , they a re r a rely , if ever , provid ed  in  exch ange for
the char i t able dona t ions . Inheren t  in  the  concept  of cha rit able
organizations, like  religions, is t ha t t hey pr ovide th eir ser vices
free of char ge, regard less of whet her  th e believer cont ribut es
fina ncia lly to the  organ iza t ion .  Some cour t s  have  hel d t h a t  if
con t r ibu t ing money i s man d a t or y, or  if t he fa ilu re t o make
cont r ibu t ion s would  de ny t he d ebtor  benefit s of t he ch urch ,
th en  the  money was paid in  exchange for reas onable value. 158
However , even th is distin ction is tenu ous at  best. It  ma kes
lit t l e sen se t o say t ha t if a  chu rch  cha rge s a dm ission , th e
money dona ted  as  tit hin g was  excha nged  for valu e, but if t he
church  does  not  requ i re dona tions, the  same se rvices  a re
valueless. The ser vices ar e th e sam e, the r equirem ent s ar e th e
sam e, a n d  a n y distinction is one of form a nd n ot of subst an ce.
Moreover , sin cere r eligious  believer s consid er  pa ying t ith ing a
commandm ent of God. Consequ ent ly, even if the chu rch does
n ot  specifically rest rict pa rt icipat ion in religious a ctivities to
con t r ibu t ing mem ber s, sin cere beli ever s ca n  only feel good
about  ta kin g ad van ta ge of th e ben efits  if th ey ar e sa tis fying t he
requ i remen t s of their  convict ions.  Th er efor e, e ven  if t he ch urch
does not  sp ecifi ca lly  dicta te it, for sin cere believers,
con t r ibu t ing t i thes i s manda tory .
Desp ite  th e a bove a rguments , mos t  cour t s  agree tha t  the
valu e of th e ser vices pr ovided by r eligious orga niza tion s is
u n definable.159 Although churches provide friendship, suppor t ,
answers to qu es t ion s,  fee lin gs  of peace, a nd cou ns elin g, th e
valu e of th ese services is incalculable.160 Th i s i n abil it y t o place
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services provide d for ta x pur poses. 
161. But see In  re Na var ro, 83 B.R. 3 48, 357 (Ba nk r. E .D. Pa . 1988); Ellenberg
v. Cha pel H ill Ha rves ter  Chu rch , In c., 5 9 B. R. 8 15,  819  (Ba nk . N .D.  Ga . 19 86);
Wils on  v. U pr ea ch M in ist ri es , 24  B.R . 97 3, 9 78 (B an kr . N .D.  Te x. 1 982 ).
162. S ee In  re Trea dwell, 699 F .2d 1050, 1051 (11t h Cir . 1983) (holding t h a t  t he
obje ct  of § 548 “is to pr event  th e debt or from d eple t i n g t he  r e sources  ava i lab le  t o
c red ito r s th rou gh  gr at ui tou s t ra ns fer s of t he  deb tor ’s p rop er ty ”). For  a h ist ori cal
deve lopmen t of the frau dulent conveyances, see Robert J. Be in , Robbing Peter to Pay
Paul: Charitable Donations as Fraudulent Tran sfers, 100 DI C K . L. RE V. 103, 107-17
(199 5).  
163. S ee 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1996). For a h istor ical d eve lopm en t of t he
f r audu len t conveya nces, s ee Bein , supra  note 162, at  107-17.
a  va lu e on  th e se rvices p rovid ed  by ch urches  and t he fa ct  tha t
those serv ices a re  not  provided in  excha nge for a  cha rit able
cont r ibu t ion  or donation makes contr ibutions to those
or ga n iza t ion s  “ch a r i t a ble  con t r ibu t ions . ”  Re l igiou s
orga niza t ion s probably do provide a va lu able  se rvice  in t e rms of
suppor t , fellowship, an d comfort. However, th ose services do
not sa tisfy the r equirem ent s for § 548.161
This  ina bility t o place a  valu e on  services provided by
churches creat ed th e problem addr essed in  Young. Section 548
was int end ed t o void conveyan ces th at  wer e ma de in  an
att empt  to defrau d creditors.162 The t ypical situa tion was  wher e
deb tor s would t ransfer  a ll of t heir  pr ope r ty t o a  close fr ien d or
fam ily member  shor tly before b an kr up tcy. In  order  to a void
hav ing to p rove actua l  fraud , the legislatur e included in § 548 a
clause for  impu t ing fr aud  where the  debtor  d id  not  r ece ive
equ iva len t  value for her  t r ans fe r .163 Th is  cons t ruct ive  fraud
serves  a bon a fide  pu rp ose a nd  pr otect s cre dit ors fr om h avin g to
p rove th at  ever y tr an sfer  wa s don e in b ad  fait h. However, it  is
imp or tan t  to rem ember  th at  it is st ill fra ud t ha t t he s t a t u t e
was  in tended to p reven t .
The tr ouble  in the stat ute ar ises when it is applied to
char i t able contr ibut ions. As expla ined a bove, it is impossible to
p lace a  va lu e on  thes e con t r ibu t ion s.  However , t ha t  doe s n ot
mean th at  th e tr an sfers were m ade in  an  a t t empt  to defraud
creditors. In  fact ,  a s in  Young, the opposite is  t r u e. Most
debtors, lik e t he You ngs, ha d n o inte nt ion of defrau din g th eir
creditors, but  wer e exer cising good-faith  religiou s beliefs. In
these s itua t ions, th e const ru ctive fra ud pr ovision of § 548 does
not  pr event  fra ud , but  ins tea d yields  an  ina ppr opria te r esu lt
where desp ite  act u a l good faith  th e code declares t he
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164. S ee In  re Youn g, 8 2 F .3d  140 7, 1 414  (8t h C ir . 19 96).
165. S ee id . 
166. S ee Treadw ell,  699 F.2d at  105 1 (“The object of [§] 548 is to prevent th e
deb tor  from depleting the r esources available to creditors thr ough grat uitous tr ansfers
of th e debt or’s proper ty.”); Bein, supra  not e 162, a t 107 -17. 
167. S ee generally Bein, supra  note 162, at  107-17 (t ra c ing  the h i sto ry and
background of § 548). 
168. 170 B.R. 585 (Ba nk r. E .D. Mich. 199 3), cert. d eni ed s ub  nom . Allard v.
Hi lton , 116 S .Ct . 156 8 (199 6); see also In re Grigonis, 208 B.R. 950, 955 (Bank r. D.
Mon t.  1997); (recognizing th at  th ere a re “an  ar ra y of consumer  t ransact ions  tha t
res ult  in a bsolu te ly n o ben efit  to t he  pu rch as er s’ cred itor s–fr om ticket s  to Broadway
shows an d ex clus ive s por tin g eve nt s, t o hou rl y cha rg es for  music, sport s or la ngu age
lessons, to a ny  an d a ll for ms  of re cre at iona l tr ave l, t o na me a few”); Duclos, supra
no te 23, at 686-87 (noting that ban kruptcy code creates absur d results  when a pplied
to religiou s cont ribu tion s). 
conveyance fra ud ulen t. Th is is t he in her ent  pr oblem in  the
Ban kr upt cy Code th at  th e Young cour t st ru ggled to resolve.
2. Give religious organizat ions the sam e benefit of the doubt as
cas in os
 The t ru s t ee  in  t h e  Y ou n g case never  charged  the Youngs
with  having any intent to defrau d their creditors.164 In  fact ,  the
tr ust ee d id  not  accu s e t h e  Youngs of any  improper  conduct  and
the cour t  noted tha t  the Youngs had  not  changed  the frequency
or  the  amoun t  of the ir  con t r ibu t ions  to the  church .165 Cer ta inly,
if the You ngs  had a n  in ten t ion  to de fraud t he cr ed it or s th ey
would  have con t r ibu ted  more m oney,  or  th e ir  fraudu len t  in ten t
would  ha ve man ifested itself in th eir su dden ly sta r t ing to
con t r ibu te  money to the  church .
The purpose of § 548 is to p r event  persons  who rea lize that
th ey ar e going ba nk ru pt  from giving everything t hey own to
someone, th en  decla rin g ban kr up tcy, and lea vin g t heir  cred it ors
with  litt le or  no a s set s  t o r ecover .166 The fr amers of t he  st a tu t e
never  int end ed for it  to be u sed t o force cha rit able  ins tit u t ions
and religiou s or ga niza t ion s t o refu nd  m oney given t o them  by
th eir  mem ber s in  good fait h. 167 It  could be a rgu ed tha t  the
st a tu t e is devoid of intent because the legislature want ed to
s t r ict ly pr eser ve fun ds for t he  cred itor s. H owever , th e effect  of
th e s t a tut e int erp ret ed t ha t wa y is to pa y credit ors by h ar min g
the hon est . The  abs ur dit y th at  can  res u l t  from such  an
ap plicat ion of the  st a tu te  can  be see n  in  In  re Chomakos.168 In
Ch om ak os, t he  t ru s t ee  a t t empted  to force g am b ling casinos to
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169. S ee Ch om ak os, 170 B.R. at 587.
170. Id . at 595-96.
171. S ee i d .
172. S ee In  re Chom ak os, 69 F.3 d 76 9, 77 1-72 (6 th  Cir . 199 5); see also Grigonis,
208 B.R. at 958 (holding tha t psychic hotlines provide re a sonably equ iva len t  va lue
and th ere fore tr an sfers  to th em cou ld not  be voided b y th e ban kr upt cy tr ust ee). 
173. S ee supra note 172.
174. S ee Polla k, supra  note 1, at  544.
r e fu n d money t ha t  the debtor  had lost  ther e shor t ly befor e
filing ba nk ru pt cy.169 The cour t  he ld  tha t
[t]o  con clu de  th a t F la m in go [t h e ca sin o] is lia ble  in  th is ca s e
w ou ld  b e , i n  t h is  C ou r t ’s  view , to conclu de t ha t e ach  cas ino  a n d
lot t e ry  ope ra tor  i s  i n  r e a lity a  pr otect or of th e cre dit ors  of its
cus tomers ,  t o  t he  po in t  t h a t  t o  p ro tec t  t hem se lves  they  mu s t
cont inu ous ly inqu i r e  an d  be  su f f ic ien t ly  knowledgeab le  a s  t o
t h e fin a n cia l cir cu m s t a n ces  o f each  o f i t s  pa t rons  so  th a t  t h ey
ca n , in  ligh t o f th e k n ow led ge  th u s ob ta in ed , r efu se  a c ce s s  t o
ce r t a in  o f  t hose  pa t rons . 170
The cour t  took special car e to expla in t ha t t he ca sin o acted  in
good fa i th .171 This  decision  wa s a ppe ale d t o th e Sixt h  Cir cu it
Cou r t  of Appea l s and , in  denying the  sugges t ion  for r eh ea rin g,
the cour t  held tha t  gam bling was  an  inves tment  tha t  went
wrong and  th en comp ar ed ga mblin g to an  expen sive m eal,
where the  credi tor  would not be able t o void a $7,000 mea l a t  an
expen sive rest a u ran t .172 The sa me a rgum ent s could be ap plied
to justify charitable donat ions.
This  absu rd r esu l t i s crea ted  by  a  cour t  tha t  s t retches the
word ing of § 548  to pr otect  de bt ors  w h o gam ble aw ay a ll th eir
money or  spend it  fr ivolously on  ext rava ga nt  mea ls  or  t r ips , bu t
voids good-fa it h  donat ions to religious orga nizat ions. Absent
bad fa i th  by  the restauran t  or  the  cas ino,  no court would void
the debt or’s frivolous  wa st e of money on  gam blin g or meals,
even wher e th e debtor kn ows th at  ban kr upt cy is inevita ble and
is on ly h avin g on e la st  flin g. I f cour t s ca n  fin d a n  exce pt ion  for
casinos th at  act  in good fait h a nd  re st au ra nt s t ha t ch ar ge
$7,000 for  a  mea l,173  t h e n  ther e s hould  be  an  exce pt ion  for
re ligious  organ iza t ions  tha t  act  in  good  fa i th .
In  the ea r ly ca se s,  cour t s r ecogn ized a  benefit  from reli giou s
dona t ions and did not void such contr ibutions.1 7 4 Some  cour t s
have con t inued t h a t  r u le a nd fou nd t ha t , a bs en t  a  sh owin g of
fraudu len t i nt en t  by  a deb tor , t he  church  shou ld not  be
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175. S ee In  re Na var ro, 83 B.R. 348, 35 7 (Ba nk r. E .D. P a. 1 988) (“My r esol ut ion
of this contested m att er might  be different  if there were evidence tha t th ese deb tor s
were ma kin g r eligi ous  cont ri bu tion s or  sen din g th eir  son  to p a r o ch ia l  schoo l a s  pa r t
of a conscious ch oice to pres ent ly favor th eir r eligious belief over unsecured creditors.
If th e eviden ce, for exam ple, sh owed th at  tit h i n g w a s a r ela tiv ely r ecen t d ecis ion
made  by the  deb tors  i t  might  be  in fe r red  tha t  th e religious contributions are ma de
in  contemplation of bankru ptcy.”); Ellenberg v. Chapel  H ill Ha rves ter  Chu rch , Inc.,
59 B.R. 815, 819 (Ban kr . N.D. Ga. 19 86) (recognizing tha t  even  though  fr audu len t
in t en t  is n ot n eces sa ry  un der  § 548 (a)(2)(A), i n m an y ca ses the court s have decided
the iss ue  on  wh et he r o r n ot t he re  exi st ed  fra ud ul en t i nt en t);  Wils on  v. U pr ea ch
Ministries, 24 B.R. 973, 978 (Ban kr . N.D. Tex. 1982) (sta tin g th at  m a n y  of  th e cour t s
that  have imputed  fraudulen t inten t did so because ther e were independen t
indica t ions o f f raudu len t  in t en t .) .
176. S ee supra  note 175.
requ ired  to r efun d t he  mon ey.175 Cou r t s  looked a t  t he int en t  of
the debtor a s ma nifested by his a ctions to deter mine if th ere
was any  fraud  to eva luat e th e claims of th e tr ust ee.176
Moreover , cou r t s  shou ld not  force  debtor s  t o e n d life -lon g
tra dit ion s of payin g tit hin g becau se of ban kr up tcy. F ina lly,
forcing chur ches, especially small chur ches, to refund  money
donat ed to them up  to a  year ea rlier pla ces an  undue burden  on
those churches. Such a result would for ce ch ur ches to either
inve st igat e th e financial st an ding of its m ember s, or  set aside
donat ed money for one ye a r  before sp end ing it . This  would
sever ely rest r i ct  the work  a nd progress of individual churches,
pa r t icu l a rl y th ose organ ized on a congrega tion bas is, where
dona t ion s mu st be u sed imm ediat ely to cover clergy sala ries
and other operating expenses.
Ra ther  than  bu rde n  the good -fa it h  exp res sion  of reli giou s
convict ion s,  cour t s s hould  a t  lea st  t r ea t  reli giou s or ga n iza t ion s
the sam e as casin os and only void contr ibutions  where
char i t able cont r ibu t ion s were made in a bad-faith at tempt t o
avoid credi tors.  Th e fir st  st ep  wou ld  be t o de ter min e if t he
deb tor  int end ed t o defra ud  his  credit ors.  Court s ha ve been
dete rmin ing fraud and  in t en t  t o defr aud  since  cour t s began  and
th i s would  crea te n o add itiona l bur den . The cour t could
consider  factors  origina lly use d in  S herbert:
(1 ) [ w ]h e t h e r  a  d e f e n d a n t ’s  b e li e f,  or  c on d u ct  m ot iva ted  by
be lie f, is sin ce r e ly h eld ; (2) wh et h er  a d efen da n t’s belie f, or
con d u ct  m otiv at ed  by b elie f, is r elig iou s  i n  n a t u r e; (3 ) whe th e r
a  s t a t e  r egu la t ion  imposes  a  bu rd en  on  th e e xer cise  of su ch
be l ie f o r  co n d u ct ; (4 ) w h e t h e r  a  co m p e ll in g  s t at e  in t e re s t
ju s t i f ie s  t h e  bu r den  im pos ed  u pon  a d efen da n t’s belie f or
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177. Mason , supra  note 13, at  206-07.
178. It  ma y be necessar y to look not a t th e amou nt of money donat ed, but t he
percen ta ge of th e in come  don ated, be cau se m an y chu rch es r equ ir e a  per cen ta ge of
incom e an d not  a fixed a mou nt . S ee BLA C K’S  LAW DICTIONARY 1654 (4th ed. 1968)
(defining  “t i thes” as  the  “ten th  par t  of  the increase”) ; Duclos, supra not e 23, a t 676
(noting  tha t  “‘tit hin g’ refer s t o th e pr act ice of con tr ibut ing a portion of one’s income,
u s u ally one tenth, for religious purposes”). These factors are not an exhau stive l is t ,
bu t offer ideas of factors tha t could be looked at t o de termine  if  the debtor  was
actu ally intending to defraud his creditors when he made the contributions.
179. S ee supra  no t e 175  and accompany ing  t ex t .
180. S ee Bein, s u pra not e 16 2, a t 1 48-49  (“In t he ory , a d ebt or com es ou t of
ba nk ru pt cy with  no as sets  left for credit ors, bu t in  actu ality , most  credit ors would
rega rd a preservation of their claims as preferab le  to d i scharge .  Many s ta te
c on d u c t ; (5 ) whe t her  the r e  i s  a  l ess  ob t ru s i ve for m  of
regu la t ion  ava i l ab le  to  the  s t a t e .177
In  ba nkrupt cy ca se s,  the cou r t s cou ld  ba la nce cer ta in  factors
inclu din g: (1) how long the debt or ha s been a  mem ber  of th e
church , (2) how long he had  been dona ting t o the chur ch, (3)
how much  the  debtor  had  been  dona t ing and  whe ther  tha t
amount  su dd en ly in crea se d befor e ban kr up tcy,178 an d (4)
whet her  the debtor  act ive ly t ook p ar t  in  and a dvantage of t he
bene fi t s offer ed  by t he ch urch  and it s p rogr ams.  Th es e fa ctors
would  not  be difficult  to eva lua te . In  fact, in almost  a ll of t he
cases de a lin g wi th  t it h in g a nd b ankrupt cy t rust ees,  the cou r t s
m e n t ion  how a ct ive  the d ebtor  had b een  in  h is  church  and h ow
lon g he h ad  been  pa ying t ith ing. 179 Moreover , if th e debt or is
accept ing th e pr ivileges a nd  ben efits of his  mem ber sh ip, he  is
pr obably receiving value for h is money. Absent a sh owin g of
fraud, t he  cour t  shou ld not  force the  churches to re fund  the
mon ey.
Us ing the good -fa it h  tes t  and t he a bove  factors, t he Young
cour t  could  have r ea ched  the s ame r es u lt , protect ed  r elig iou s
freedoms, and not  ha d t o fu r t h e r com p li ca t e  t he
cons t it u t iona li t y issu e. The Youngs  were s in cer e in  their  bel iefs
and the re was  no indica t ion  of any intent t o defraud.
Con sequ en tly,  th e decision would be th e sam e an d th e r u le
would  be ea sier  to a pply.
Even  if there is some d emonst ra tion of inten t  to defraud on
beh alf of th e debtor, th ere is pr obably no intent  to defr a u d on
beh alf of t he  church . Ra ther  t han  force  r eligiou s or ga n iza t ion s
to repay t he tr us tee , cour ts  could allow cre dit ors t o keep t heir
claim  aga ins t  t h e bad-fa i th  deb tor .180 This would actu ally be
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exe mp tion  s t a tu t es  a r e  le s s gene rous th an  th e ban kr upt cy exempt ions, so it is
possible  for a debt or to em erge fr om ban kr upt cy with a sset s th at  poten tia lly would
be s u b je ct  to a tt ach me nt  or le vy u nd er  st at e la w. F ur th er , if th e de bt or’s
c ir cumstances subs eque nt ly impr ove, the  credit ors can  pur sue  th eir claim s via
a t t achmen t of wa ges  or  lev y of n ew ly ob ta in ed  pr ope rt y.”).
181. S ee id .
182. S ee, e.g., In re And ra de , 21 3 B. R. 7 65,  772  (Ba nk r.  E. D. C al . 19 97).
183. S ee Young, 82 F.3d at 1419-20.
184. S ee supra not es 94-111 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. 
185. S ee i d .
p r efera ble to creditors wh o, over tim e, would be able to receive
the en t ir e  amount  owed t o them , r a ther  than  a  pe rcen tage of
the sma ll amoun t contr ibuted  t o reli giou s or ga n iza t ion s. 181 In  a
Cha pter  13 situa tion, the court  could choose to extend the
payback period to the maximum time of five years to ma ke u p
for  the am ount being directed to tithing payment s.182 These
opt ion s would a llow tr uly d iligen t  religious  debt ors t o ma int ain
th eir  re ligious beliefs and  not su bject credit ors to un necessar y
burdens or greater risks of finan cial loss.
As th e Young cour t  he ld,  t h e goals of the Bankr uptcy Code
a re to allow debt or s  t o maintain t heir dignity, to get a fresh
s t a r t, and a t  the s ame t im e p rotect  the cr ed it ors fr om
unnecessa ry losses.183 A good-fa i th  t es t  p romotes  a l l of th ese
goals. The Young court  could h ave  mor e effectively protected
the free exer cise of religion and pr otecte d t he cr edit ors h ad  it
chosen to imp lemen t  the good -fa it h  tes t . Mor eove r , if t he
purpose of § 548 is to preven t “fra udu lent t ra nsfers ,” th en t he
Young cour t  could ha ve and  should h ave looked for frau dulen t
in ten t .
3. A good -fa it h  tes t w ould  not v iolat e th e Firs t A m endm ent
 As pr evious ly expla ine d, t he  Cons tit ut ion, u nder  t h e
Est abl i shment Claus e, prohibits t he governm ent  from
advancing or inh ibitin g  a n y sp ecifi c reli giou s or ga n iza t ion  or
belief.184 Adopt ing  a  good-fa i th  t es t  for  voiding fraudu len t
conveyan ces would  not  be es ta blish ing a ny p ar ticu lar  re ligion .
As explained  above , cou r t s th at  ha ve evalu at ed cre dit ors claim s
of violating th e Est ablishm ent  Claus e ha ve failed becau se th e
govern men t  i s not  forcing t h e cred it ors t o cont r ibu te t o the
reli gion .185 Nor  wou ld  eva lu a t in g t he s in cer it y of t he d ebtor ’s
belie fs violate th e Free Exercise Clau se. In United States v.
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186. 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (dete rm inin g th at  a  j u ry, in a fr au dulen tly soliciting
dona tions crimin al case , could decide wh eth er s elf-professed “faith h ealer s” sincerely
believed in t heir  abilit ies). 
187. S ee id . at  87-88  (hold ing  th at  a ju ry  sh ould no t  be  a llowed to  de t e rmine  the
“t ru th or falsity of the religious beliefs or doctrines ” but  n o t findin g err or in a llowing
the ju ry  to a ss es s t he  sin cer it y of t ho se  bel iefs ).
188. S ee supra  no t e 175  and accompany ing  t ex t .
189. S ee i d .
190. 11 U.S .C. § 548(a)(1) reads in part: “(1) made such tran sfer or incurr ed such
obliga tion  wit h a ctu al  in te nt  to h in de r,  de la y, or  de fra ud  a n y e n t it y t o  wh ich  the
debt or  wa s or  beca me , on  or a fte r t he  da te  th at  su ch t ra ns fer  wa s m ad e or  su ch
obliga tion  was  incu rr ed, in debt ed . . . .”
191. S ee In  re Ch om ak os, 1 70 B .R.  585 , 58 7-90  (Ba nk r.  E. D. M ich . 19 93).
Ballard ,186 t he  Cour t  held  tha t  a lt hough  it  is  unconst it u t ion a l t o
que st ion a p ers on’s belief, it  i s n ot  un const itu tion al t o quest ion
a  person’s  s incer i ty in those beliefs.187 I n  r ea l it y , cou r t s
r egu lar ly eva lu a te t he s in cer it y of a  pe r son s b eli efs . Cou r t s
often  eva lu a te whet her  a  bu yer  wa s a  bon a  fide p urchase r  for
UCC art icle nine purposes and for  propert y law; wheth er a
person acted in good or bad fa ith  in  con t ract s ; and , a s
pr eviously exp la in ed , bot h  cr im in a l fr aud a nd in ten t ion a l t or t s
a ll eva lu a te t he s in cer it y a nd cu lpabil it y of a
person . Fin ally, s ome cour ts  ha ve long bee n eva lua tin g th e
s ince r ity of debt ors’ belie fs. 188 Court s ha ve esta blished t ests  for
good fa it h  pr opos a ls  unde r  Ch apt er  13  pe t it ion s for
reor ga niza t ion ,189 and  cour t s  have  looked a t  fraudu len t  in ten t
un der  § 548.190 Th er e is  noth in g in her en t ly u ncon s t it u t iona l
abou t  using t he s ame a na lys is  in  a  § 548 s it ua t ion .
4. A good-faith test w ould protect both religious freedoms an d
creditors
 Section  548 creates a  r u le  t h a t  i s n ot  on ly too harsh , bu t
devoid of any  ra t iona l  bas is . I t  fa i ls  to p reven t  the  rea l  fraud
t h a t  cou ld be found  in  a  per son  gambling away h is  la s t  dollar s
or  spending those dollars on expensive dinners or trips to
Eu rope, a nd in st ead  ta kes  th e mon ey back  from good-faith
recipi en t s of charitable donat ions.191 In  rea lity, it  offers  litt le, if
any , p rotect ion  to credi tor s  and serves  only t o pr eve nt  a  pe r son
from rece iv ing  the comfor t  and  joy  tha t  accompanies dona t ing
to a cha rit able  organ izat ion an d r epla ces it w ith  th e
embar rassment  and pa in  th at  is inher ent  in ha ving a chur ch be
forced to refund dona ted m oney. Cert ainly, § 548 was inten ded
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192. S ee H.R. 2604, 105th Cong. (1997) (adding a subsection (3) that  exempts
cont ri bu tion s to c ha ri ta ble  or ga ni za ti on s fr om  11 U .S. C. § 5 48(1 )(B)); S. 1244 , 105 th
Cong. (1997 ) (prop osin g to e xem pt  cha ri ta ble con tr ibu tion s  fr om  avoidance under  11
U.S.C. § 548); H.R. 2611, 105th Cong. (1997) (establishing prote cti on for sincere
re ligious dona tion s). 
193. S ee H.R. 26 04, 105t h Con g. (1997); S. 1244, 105 th  Cong. (1997). 
t o p rot ect  cr edi tor s  from “fraudu len t  t r ans fe r s” and  not  t o
degrade and disgrace the debtor and pun ish  the  good-fa i th
recipi en t .
Con ver sely,  a good-faith  tes t wou ld pr otect t he e xercise of
s ince re religious freedoms an d preven t  debtors  from being
ha rm ed by fr audu len t  t r ans fe r s t o r eligious organizations.
Alth ough  cred it ors w ould  not  be  able  to void  good-fa it h  reli giou s
donations, th is m in or r educt ion i n t he ir  powe r  is ju s t ified by
the need to protect th e free exercise of religious rights.
C. Con gres s N eeds to Act
 T h e good-fa ith  te st  ad vocate d by t h is Note an d used  by
numerous court s constitut es a r e a sonable const ru ction of § 548
as it a pplies  in t he u nique ly sen si t ive  context  of reli giou s
donations. H owever , Con gr es s cou ld  pu t  th is  in ter pr et a t ion  on
more solid footing by expres sly recognizing it. Ther e ar e
cu r ren tly thr ee bills under consideration in Congress that
would  amend 11 U.S.C. § 548 to provide  protect ion  for
char i t able con t r ibu t ions  to reli giou s or ga n iza t ion s. 192 Two of th e
th ree  bills p ropose to make con t r ibu t ions  to char it able  reli giou s
orga niza t ion s exe mpt  from § 548(a )(2).193 Al though  those two
bills would provide the n ecess a ry supp or t  and p rotect ion  for
since re religious  beliefs, th ey fail t o provide for a  good-fait h
tes t , and ther efor e s ubject  cred it ors t o bad-fa i th  conveyances to
reli giou s organizat ions .  Rather  than creat ing a  b lanket
exce pt ion  for  reli giou s orga n iza t ion s,  Con gr es s cou ld  pr otect  the
r igh t s of credi tor s , and  avoid cons t itu t iona l  claim s  under  the
Es tabl ishment  Clau se, by t re at ing r eligious orga niza tion s like
any other legal ent ity an d looking for actua l fraud ulent
conveyances.
One of the  pr oposed bill s pr ovides for the good-faith test
advocat e d in t his  Note . Hous e re solut ion 2611 s ta tes  in
per t inen t  pa rts  t ha t  “a  t r ans fe r  of a  dona t ion  to a  re ligious
gr oup or ent ity, mad e by a debt or  fr om  a  se nse  of reli giou s
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obliga t ion , such  as  t ithes,  sha ll be  consider ed to ha ve been
made  in excha nge for a  rea sona bly equ ivalen t  v a lue .”194 House
Resolu t ion  2611 requir es  tha t  the con t r ibu t ion  be  made  from a
“sense of religious  obligat ion.”195 Und er  H.R.  2611, cou r t s w ould
be required to eva lu a te t he s in cer it y of a  de bt or ’s r eli giou s
belie fs before gr an t in g protect ion  from a  bankrup tcy . As
advocated  in  th is  Not e, t ha t  wou ld  pr ovid e t he op t im al supp or t
for  r eli giou s  f reedoms a nd cr ed it or s.  Th is  app r oach
sim ult an eously  protects legitim at e inter e st s, while p reve nt ing
abu se.
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 The Young cou r t  correct ly app lied RF RA in t he  bankrup tcy
conte xt.  As the Young cour t  conclu de d,  RF RA is  const it u t ion a l
in  federal law, specifically bank ru ptcy. Voidin g r eli giou s
contr ibutions, th erefore, unjus tifiably burden s the free exercise
of religion. However, th e Young cour t  cou ld have reached the
same re su lt w ith out  an alyz ing RFR A by rea din g a good-faith
test  int o § 548. As cur ren tly in ter pret ed, § 548 prevents th e
exercise of sincere r eligious beliefs; a ddit iona lly, the  cur ren t
in te rpre t at ion  crea tes  the a bs urd r es u lt  wh er e r eli giou s
orga niza t ion s a re  forced to re fund  prepet i t ion  dona t ions  bu t
cas inos a re  not .  T h e m ost viable option t o protect both sin cere
reli giou s believers an d creditors of bank ru pt per sons is  to look
for  actua l fr a u d and r em ove t he “const ruct ive  fraud” pr ovis ion
creat ed by § 548(a)(2) in  the con text  of reli giou s con t r ibu t ion s.
When  decidin g wheth er t o void religious contr ibutions wh ere
valu e of services p rovide d, a lth ough  r eal, can not be defined,
cour t s sh ould  not  im pu te fr aud,  bu t  sh ould  look for a ctua l fr aud
by reviewing th e debtor’s hist ory. Only when RF RA and § 548
a re reconciled a nd  court s a re a llow ed  t o search  for  fraud  and
offer less d egra din g solut ions t o prot ect cred itor s can  th is
qua gmire of religious a nd constit ut ional debat e be resolved.
David  Lyn n M ortensen
